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Every year, the United States uses foreign aid as a foreign policy tool. The Arab Spring 
gave the United States an opportunity to achieve a historically difficult task in the Middle 
East: promoting and establishing democracy across the Middle East. This study examines 
United States foreign aid, primarily military and economic aid, and the success it has on 
the ruling governing bodies in Libya and Egypt. Does American foreign aid lead to 
stability of the recipient government? The majority of published works regarding foreign 
aid effectiveness utilize a large-n case study over several decades without thoroughly 
examining each case.  The following study focuses on research from 2011-2016 with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. Research Question and Significance 
  Are the resources that the United States government sends to governments in the 
Middle East helping or hurting the survival of the regime they are supporting? The 
United States has long used foreign aid as a tool in foreign policy, including economic, 
military, and political aid. In 2011, the Arab Spring removed autocratic governments that 
held power for decades. The transition from autocratic to democratic rule brought forth 
instability on varying levels.  The results of this study with examine whether foreign aid 
from the United States, whether it is economic, military, and political or a combination of 
all three, leads to stability in Libya and Egypt. 
The link between foreign aid and regime stability is significant because the War 
on Terror is still in effect and the United States is looking at ways to continue to combat 
this problem. After the Arab Spring, strongholds for terrorism appeared in the North 
Africa and the Middle East region (MENA). Military aid is spent towards combating 
Islamist terror groups, such as the Islamic State and other jihadist groups inside Egypt 
and Libya. As long as there are safe havens for terrorist groups, radical groups will 
continue to grow and act as a destabilizing force in regions not only in the Middle East 
and North Africa, but around the world.  
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In this chapter, I introduce a literature review that will divide various opinions 
regarding foreign aid and whether or not it leads to stability. The first portion will be 
optimistic, summarizing published work believing foreign aid is effective and leads to 
stability. The next portion is published works stating foreign aid does not lead to stability. 
Next, I include various hypotheses connecting the schools of thought and my 
methodology and using Middle Eastern cases for testing.  
II. Literature Review 
 There are several arguments within the literature ranging from statements that 
foreign aid helps stabilize governments, to where they do not help and only prop up 
repressive ones. Other arguments are that aid only works in democratic countries and not 
autocratic ones. There are many arguments within foreign aid and stabilization.  
There is a classification for the different kinds of aid. There is research for 
civilian aid to help boost economies and ways of life and there is a division for military 
aid saying if it is a good idea or bad idea to give this type of assistance to current regimes. 
I will review and categorize the literature based on two approaches: authors who are 
optimistic and pessimists who believe aid is ineffective. 
There are different ideas that stem off the optimistic and pessimistic views of 
foreign aid. The first is the statement that foreign aid does work regardless of who is 
receiving it. Next, is the argument that foreign aid works; however, there are states that 
need it more than others and it requires more of an effort than just “throwing money” at 
the problem. There are pessimists in the field that believe aid does not work at all, either 




governments use the money and military resources to strengthen their security personnel 
and not actively fight terrorism in their state.  
IIa. Division within Optimists 
 The first debate is about whether foreign aid helps provide stability. These 
studies focus primarily on economic aid rather than military aid. Bader and Faust (2014) 
argue that foreign aid stabilizes authoritarian and democratic regimes alike. Their 
research looks at the effectiveness of aid based on different domestic incentives. Ahmed 
(2012) states autocratic countries that receive foreign aid are less likely to have a collapse 
or major political dissent. Yom and Gause (2012) explain that many of the monarchies 
receive a lot of indirect and direct foreign aid, but the rulers use this money to counter 
political opposition that might stand in their way. This is beneficial for the United States 
due to the recipient effectively using aid to qualm political unrest among the local 
populace.  
There are scholars that believe foreign aid is effective; however, there are states 
that need it more than others. Baccini and Urpelainen (2012) state that developing, young 
democratic countries need more aid than autocracies because they will spend the money 
on their population, unlike an autocrat who would likely abuse the opportunity and put 
funds towards other sectors such as their own bank accounts or the military. Baccini and 
Urpelainen (2012) used a quantitative model that specifically deals with economics and 
does not look at internal security. Dadush and Dunne (2011) state that foreign aid does 
work to stabilize regimes, but it has to be a long process, meaning time matters. The 




Trade agreements have to be established to provide a steady economic growth. The 
country giving aid has to have a more “hands on” approach towards the recipients. The 
more time the donor country invests in the recipient, the better the investment will 
become. Malik and Awadallah’s The Economics of the Arab Spring (2013), foreign aid is 
important for transitional governments because the Arab Spring was fueled by poverty, 
unemployment and lack of economic opportunity. Awadallah argues economic instability 
was the main cause of the uprising and without economic assistance, countries would fall 
back into revolution. 
Other research examined nations receiving aid rather than looking at nations who 
give aid, specifically the United States. Selim (2013) argues that, although the United 
States gave foreign aid to Egypt, the mass uprisings were too great for the recipient 
government to suppress, forcing the United States to switch their support towards the 
protestors. Even though they want to support the monarchy or regime in power, the task 
of supporting the current regime was too much to overcome. No military aid or economic 
aid could have prevented President Mubarak from being overthrown.   
IIb. Pessimists 
Some contend that foreign aid does not work at all. Zune and Brownlee both 
testify to this. Zune (2011) uses Yemen as a single case study focusing on the Obama 
administration and the ongoing situation in Yemen. Zune (2011) is against foreign aid 
due to the inability of the Yemeni government to disperse wealth to areas that need 
economic or military assistance. Brownlee (2011) is skeptical about democratization and 




for democracy. Deep sectarian violence and religious divides are simply too much to 
overcome to have a successful democracy.  
Azam and Thelen (2010) use a two-part methodology in their cross-national 
empirical analysis in exploring their solutions to their puzzle. They make the correlation 
that there is a relationship between the amount of foreign aid and the number of attacks 
stating they would increase, especially if there is a United States military presence (Azam 
& Thelen, 2010). This piece uses two different data sources for the dependent variable. 
The first source is the ARQADE data set, made from information once available to the 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) website. The other is from the 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) data set (Azam & 
Thelen, 2010). Results from the data display a positive correlation between terrorist 
attacks and increase number of troops stationed in Middle East from 1990-2001.  
 Young & Findley (2011) use the same databases as Azam and Thelen with 
ITERATE and AidData. Young and Findley argue that foreign aid does essentially fight 
terrorism and reduce instability when it is applied to specific parts of the economy. For 
the next set of hypothesis where terrorist attacks are the main cause of interest, Bouton 
(2014) uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which tracks location, year, and 
primary attack of over 80,000 terrorist attacks from 1970-2012. Within the data they look 
at number of attacks directed at US interests in a host country in a given year, attacks 
directed at non-US targets and total attacks in a host country. The GTD classifies terrorist 
attacks according to the country where they take place, not the nationality of the terrorist 
(Boutton, 2014). They found that states that receive foreign aid to fight terrorism will not 




fight terrorism will continue to receive money and military equipment from the United 
States. If the recipient is effective in eliminating terrorism, the United States will not 
continue to contribute financially to that state. States with a terrorism problem have a 
desire to fight the problem, however the incentive to not fight is greater. Boutten and 
Carter (2014:15) use the US Agency for International Development as a source for data. 
This source is the agency in the United States government responsible for distributing 
economic and military aid.   
Kono and Montinola (2013) article ties in with Boutton (2014) because Kono 
argues that powers such as the United States should not give aid to autocratic rulers 
because they will misuse the aid and let it go towards their military. Countries will 
pretend to be involved in the fight against terrorism so there will be a consistent cash 
flow from the United States. As long as there is a security problem, recipients will 
continue to combat terrorism in order to maintain cash flow.  
Neumayer and Plumper (2011) identify origins of anti-American terrorism from 
1978-2005. This is important because they want to understand why there is hostility 
towards Americans in the region. The article defines terrorist attacks as means used by 
(radical) political groups to pursue goals and strategies. The authors use a rational 
approach for defining terrorism assuming terrorists want to gain influence or achieve 
goals (Neumayer & Plumper, 2011). Neumayer and Plumper (2011) distinguish between 
different kinds of terrorist actors. For example, there is the terrorist group, the 
government of the terrorists’ home country with which the group is in conflict with, and 




government. The distinction allows them to link terrorist attacks on foreign citizens to a 
political conflict between the terror group and its government.  
Young and Findley (2011) are pro-foreign aid indicating it does work if it is used 
towards certain parts of the economy. After 9/11, foreign aid started to become an 
important tool in fighting the “War on Terror”. At the same time, other countries started 
to rely on foreign aid to prevent terrorism in their country. Young and Findley use data 
from 147 countries from 1973-2004. Looking at this data, terrorism has changed 
significantly during this time period. Groups like Al Qaida and the Taliban did not exist 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The authors do a good job of addressing claims saying that 
aid should not work. They first argue that aid might not have an effect on factors that 
reduce terrorism such as poverty (Young & Findley, 2011). Scholars in the field make the 
connection that terrorists are uneducated and live in poverty. Young and Findley show 
that terrorist leaders are more likely to recruit higher educated, skilled individuals to run 
their cells around the world. This means that low levels of poverty or education in a 
country might not affect terrorist activities and more economic growth might not reduce 
terrorist activities (Young & Findley, 2011). Aid used towards education and conflict 
prevention/resolution had negative effects on terrorism. Aid applied towards governing, 
health and civil society reduced terrorism.  
The next several sections will lay out my research design and will show what 






III. My Study 
A lot of the scholarship I researched was published during the Arab Spring. 
During the time of publications, the uprisings were either still underway or just 
beginning. Now that it has been six years since the start of the Arab Spring, I can analyze 
how the transitions have been going and how the current regimes are still handling 
transitions now. Using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) accompanied by examining 
the amount of aid through U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), I can 
examine the relationship between amounts of aid, attacks, and the failed state index. 
Neumayer & Plumper (2011) and Kono & Montinola (2013) use close large-n case 
studies with statistics; however their studies stop short of the Arab Spring.  
My question will fill in the gaps after their studies via condensed regional data 
and case research. I am going to research a specific part of the world in a short time 
period. George and Bennett (2005:17) define a case as “an instance of a class of events”. 
The term “class of events” refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as 
revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or personality 
types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory regarding 
the causes of similarities or differences among instances of that class of events (pg 17-
18). The study will be motivated towards effects of foreign aid towards transitional 
democracies. George & Bennett (2005:18) argue for the advantage of comparing small-n 
cases in a short time period allows for internal examination of single cases. Research for 
each case will be in depth and will foster a clearer understanding of causal mechanisms. 
As for my independent variable, I combine both military and civilian aid. A lot of the 




general way of life or military aid with fighting terrorism or improving internal security. 
Foreign aid has several different functions. The first function of aid is the ability to 
strengthen relationships between the donor county and the recipient. Aid is good for 
building a trustful relationship between two countries. Foreign aid is also an effective soft 
power tool that can be used unilaterally, or multilaterally. Foreign aid can be used to 
assist recipient countries in diminishing economic, social, and security issues.  
My thesis will analyze the effect of American foreign aid has on the current 
governments of Egypt and Libya. My research will analyze why Egypt is stabilized and 
Libya is not. Both of these cases received high rankings for instability through Foreign 
Policy’s failed state index and are facing security threats from terror groups in each of 
their countries and the region in general.  
IIIb. Hypotheses 
Because of the rise of Islamist groups in North Africa and the Middle East, along 
with the various divisions of the field, I have developed several hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is the idea that high amounts of aid, whether it is economic or military is not 
effective when the recipient is incapable of governing itself effectively, meaning a null 
hypothesis. Egypt and Libya receive vastly different amounts of military aid. Egypt 
receives approximately a billion dollars a year in military aid, along with military 
equipment from the United States. Military aid to Libya can be described as sporadic. In 
the 2011 and 2013 fiscal year, Libya received $30 million from the United States, 




amounts of aid to an unstable state will lead to additional instability, creating an inverse 
relationship between aid and stability.  
The second hypothesis involves military aid. When there is more military aid than 
economic aid, results can be unpredictable towards the recipient regardless of whether 
they are stable or failing. An increase of military aid to an undemocratic state will not 
lead to democracy. I will use Egypt as examples for this hypothesis. In 2010, before 
President Mubarak was overthrown, Egypt received a little over 1.5 billion dollars in aid, 
with 1.3 billion of that going towards peace and security. Out of 1.3 billion dollars, all of 
2.8 million went towards stabilization operations and security sector reform 
(ForeignAssistance.gov).  
My last hypothesis is any amount of aid, economic or military is effective when 
the recipient is fairly stable because there are no major issues to warrant mass protests 
which would test the capabilities of the ruling regime. For example, an increase of aid to 
an already stable state will lead to more stability. On the other side of the spectrum, no 
amount of foreign aid will help stabilize an already stable government.  
For the design, I will be using a small-n comparative case study consisting all of 
two countries, Libya and Egypt. I chose these countries because they are both went 
through a revolution that uprooted long term autocratic rulers, are potential safe havens 
for terrorist activity, and the survival of the current governments have regional 
implications. Prior to the Arab Spring, both cases oppressed political dissent. Both cases 
have a problem with armed Islamist militias. While my cases have similar characteristics, 




During Qaddafi’s rule, every aspect of society was fun through his family, including the 
military. That is why the military disintegrated during the revolution and political process 
and it had to be rebuilt from the ground up. Egypt’s military is their own separate entity 
separate from their government. Egypt and Libya’s governments were and still are 
fundamentally different. Egypt’s government foundation is much more solid compared to 
Libya’s and that explains why Egypt had an easier transition period.  
Libya is 85% urban compared to Egypt’s 43%. Libya’s is much higher because 
most of the population lives in cities that border the Mediterranean Sea (Gelvin, 
2015:34). Egypt was able to survive the transition because of their institutions. While 
Egypt was under colonial rule, they adopted European modeled institutions (Gelvin, 
2015:36). Qaddafi attempted to establish the same model as Egypt; however, he gave up 
after six days concluding “Libya was no Egypt” (Gelvin, 2015:70).  Gelvin describes 
normal states as having a territory, functioning government and bureaucracy that rules 
over national territory, and a national identity. Weak states, like Libya lack the last two 
characteristics (Gelvin, 2015:73).  
I will be using foreignassistance.gov for statistics on foreign aid. Within the 
website, I am going to use Peace and Security as the sole category. The data will show 
how much money is going to each country, each sector, and what it is supposed to be 
used for. I will be showing data starting from 2011 to the most current year available.  
I will use different indicators to examine each dependent variable. For political 
stability, I will use Freedom House rankings. For economic stability, I will use GDP, 




For the security dependent variable, I examine terror groups in both case studies, the 
amount of terror attacks, and the amount of deaths to measure. I also examine how 
effective and influential various terror groups are. All dependent variables are measured 
from 2011-2016.  
For the security dependent variable, I use the Global Terrorism Database. Several 
authors in my literature review have used the Global Terrorism Database, which tracks 
location, year, and primary attack of incidents from a specific amount of time. I will use 
data from 2011 to most 2016. Since the term “terrorism” is so broad, it is important to 
clearly define it for my study. The database gives three different kinds of criterion. The 
first definition is “the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal” (GlobalTerrorismDatabase, 2017).  The second criterion is, “there must be 
evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey other messages to a larger 
audience or audiences than the immediate victims” (GlobalTerrorismDatabase, 2017). 
The last one is “the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. 
the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law 
(particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants” 
(GlobalTerrorismDatabase, 2017). There is some data where there is uncertainty if an 
incident meets the desired criteria. I chose to not include uncertain data because it could 
inflate the data or skew results. The database includes attempted attacks, which will be 
part of my data because they still meet the first three criteria mentioned.  
 I examine sources of different data that will explain the relationships between my 
independent and dependent variables (George & Bennett, 2005). Process tracing can also 




thought of asking (George & Bennett 2005). George and Bennett (2005, 17) mention a 
“bigger is better” culture where there is a preference of “large n statistical studies” over 
“small-n studies” when there is enough data available for study. In statistical studies, 
there is always the risk of “conceptual stretching”, by pairing dissimilar cases to obtain a 
larger sample (George & Bennett, 2005). This will not be an issue because my puzzle is 
not going to include a large number of cases.  
This thesis will proceed as follows: Chapter one discusses and analyzes the 
security situation in Libya and Egypt from 2011-2016. I will discuss USAID’s strategy 
for both cases, a brief background of American military aid, and finally why Libya and 
Egypt have been unsuccessful in eliminating their terrorism problem. Chapter two is the 
economic chapter. Chapter two examines American foreign aid towards economic 
development in Egypt and Libya. The second chapter will show Libya has the tools to 
have a stable economy, but a lack of direction and lack of budget prevent progress. The 
Egyptian economy is not progressing and is relying on short-medium term loans from 
Gulf States to keep their economy afloat. The second chapter will show United States’ 
economic foreign aid has been unsuccessful in both cases. The third chapter will look at 
political stability in Egypt and Libya.  That chapter discusses why Libya is a weak state 
and Egypt is not and will describe United States involvement in the political process of 










Chapter 2: U.S Military Aid to Egypt and Libya 
I. Introduction 
The following chapter will discuss the United States’ military foreign aid to Egypt 
and Libya. The purpose of the chapter is to show how serious the security situation is, 
particularly in the Sinai and Libya in general. This chapter will analyze several 
terrorist groups and their success in preventing both countries from being fully stable 
and the danger they pose for further progress. Different aspects of black market 
economies, like smuggling and arms trading fuel these Islamic terrorist groups 
allowing them to continue operations throughout the region. I argue that American 
military aid is not effective in preventing terrorist attacks in both of my case studies.  
First, I will look at USAID’s strategy of countering extremism and insurgencies 
including factors, called “push factors” that can cause somebody to radicalize. Next, I 
will examine the military aid relationship between the United States and Egypt 
followed up with how Sisi’s regime handled protests and the link that has towards the 
distrust between law enforcement and the locals. In regards to Libya, I will show how 
sophisticated the different terror groups are, how they have been successful in gaining 
influence and territory within Libya, and how difficult it will be to solve the security 
problem in Libya.  
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Ia. USAID’s strategy of fighting insurgencies  
In 2011, USAID developed a policy titled The Development Response to Violent 
Extremism and Insurgency. The purpose was to provide a policy framework USAID 
could use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent 
extremism and insurgency (USAID, 2011). The policy looked to help USAID focus 
closer on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to long-term security and 
development goals. USAID recognizes that each situation is different and the terms and 
development response will need to be guided by American foreign policy (USAID, 
2011). USAID’s policy guides their organization to consider key criteria at the earliest 
state of program development, recognizing the response is part of a broader effort. The 
standards include an assessment of the catalysts of violent extremism and insurgency, 
host country commitment, and potential development responses. Other criteria include 
determination of an appropriate and critical role for development assistance (USAID, 
2011). 
 The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states, “We are engaged in a 
broad, sustained and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power-
military, civilian, and the power of our values-together with the concerted efforts of 
allies, partners, and multilateral institutions. Efforts must be complemented by broader 
capabilities such as diplomacy, development, strategic communications, and the power of 
the private sector” (USAID, 2011). USAID defines violent extremism as “advocating, 
engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified 
violence to further social, economic, and political objectives. An insurgency is defined as 
an organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political 
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control of a region. It is a political and territorial struggle where both sides use armed 
forces to create space for their political, economic, and influence activities to be effective. 
(USAID, 2011).  
Ib. Factors that could lead to radicalization 
Multiple factors can lead to multiple paths to fuel an individual to radicalize. 
USAID calls these “push factors”. These factors can be anything from long-standing 
grievances, to recent developments. USAID has learned that socioeconomic frustrations 
are significant not because of actual material deprivation, but because of the perception 
that government has abandoned them, much like the current situation in the Sinai 
Peninsula (USAID, 2011). Some more examples include levels of social marginalization 
and fragmentation among first and second generation rural-to-urban migrants. 
Socioeconomic frustrations may trigger a search for identity, meaning, and purpose 
(USAID, 2011). Poorly governed areas may lead to violent extremists establishing 
sanctuaries or safe havens. A lack of services like security creates a window of 
opportunity for jihadist groups to take advantage and gain support from the local 
population. Cruel treatment by police or security forces can lead to a desire for revenge 
and gives birth to a greater desire to embrace violent extremism (USAID, 2011).  USAID 
responds to violent extremism by taking preventive measures that target geographic areas 
or populations believed to be vulnerable to the jihadists’ appeals. Programs in these areas 
are generally small scale and distinct, but are part of a larger, developing portfolio 




II. American military aid to Egypt 
Between 1948 and 2015, the United States gave Egypt $76 billion in bilateral 
foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars-not adjusted for inflation), including $1.3 
billion a year in military aid from 1987 to present day (Sharp, 2015). Since the 1979 
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, the United States has provided Egypt with large amounts 
of military assistance. American policymakers have viewed aid to Egypt as an investment 
to regional stability, but mainly on long-running military cooperation and on sustaining 
the treaty-principles that are supposed to be mutually reinforcing (Sharp, 2015). All U.S 
military aid to Egypt finances the obtaining of weapons systems and services from U.S 
defense contractors. Egypt is one of the main recipients of FMF, a program with an 
appropriations account administered by the Department of State but implemented by the 
Department of Defense (Sharp, 2015). FMF is a grant program that permits governments 
to receive equipment and associated training from the U.S government or to access 
equipment through U.S commercial channels. Most countries receiving FMF purchase 
goods and services through government-to-government contracts, also known as Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS). The Obama administration has announced that future FMF grants 
may only be used to purchase equipment specifically for “counterterrorism, border 
security, Sinai security, and maritime security” (and for maintenance of weapons systems 
already in Egypt’s arsenal) (Sharp, 2015). In order for the Egyptian military to be 
prepared to fight an unconventional war, they will need “heavy investment into rapid 
reaction forces equipped with sophisticated infantry weapons, optics and communication 
gear back by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. Egypt will also 
need numerous modern aviation assets to transport their assets (Sharp, 2015).  
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 Egypt is an important regional actor in the Middle East due to their population 
size, army strength, and religious authority in the Muslim world, along with their foreign 
policy ties to the United States and a “cold peace” with Israel in regards to Egypt’s 
engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Burgrova, 2014). The 2011 revolt and 
transitional process brought security issues to Egypt that has the potential to affect the 
wider regional security situation brought on by the government mismanaging the security 
apparatus and failed to deliver security as a fundamental and essential public good 
(Burgrova, 2014).  
IIa. How Egyptian security forces handled the uprising 
 The Weberian conception of the modern state is defined as a “functioning state 
that has to possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a given territory and its 
inhabitants” (Burgrova, 2014). When the state fails to accomplish this, the social contract 
between the state and citizens is broken. To counter this, citizens started to pledge loyalty 
towards non-state actors who will appear to ensure their security (Burgrova, 2014). 
During the Mubarak era, the security apparatus was used to discipline dissenters and 
protect the ruling establishment. Rampant use of torture and lack of accountability was a 
catalyst for the uprising that began in 2011 and it was not by accident the protests began 
on January 28. On the fourth day of protests, security forces withdrew from the public 
space altogether (Burgrova, 2014). Even though the Egyptian military was deployed in 
the streets during the 18-days, a security vacuum emerged. Police officers stopped 
patrolling neighborhoods and returned to the police stations. Egypt’s security forces’ 
actions have been described as polarized. At one end of the spectrum, Egyptian police are 
described as either passive or unwilling to commit to their job. On the other side, they are 
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viewed as using brutal tactics and cracking down on the populace, creating distrust 
between Egyptians and the state security body (Burgrova, 2014). There is a correlation 
between the failing security apparatus in Egypt and the increased demand for black 
weapon markets. Since 2011, demand has increased significantly, in some cases prices 
double or tripled (Burgrova, 2014). Once Qaddafi was toppled, heavy weapons like 
ground to ground missiles and rocket propelled grenades were brought over the border 
into Egypt. Regular citizens are using weapons like shotguns and homemade rifles to 
defend themselves against criminals (Burgrova, 2014). Another internal security issue is 
the uncontrolled intake and circulation of weapons acquired by non-state actors like 
criminal groups and militias (Burgrova, 2014).  
IIb. Terror groups in Egypt and their influence 
Over the past few years, Salafist groups have succeeded in gaining influence in the 
Sinai. Sharia courts emerged as an alternative to traditional tribal courts. While the 
Bedouins were focused on carrying out attacks at Egyptian personnel, Jihadi militants 
turned their attention to plan attacks on Israel (Burgrova, 2014). Weapons like Rocket 
Propelled Grenades (RPG’s), machine guns and suicide car bombs have become the 
standard order of battle for militants to carry out their attacks. The deposition of 
Muhammad Morsi had a direct effect on the increase of terrorist attacks within Egypt. 
Some of the more active groups like Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, found an effective 
twist in their logic to expand the list of their enemies and include new military-backed 
Egyptian leadership (Burgrova, 2014). The overthrow of Morsi and repression of Muslim 
Brotherhood was seen as hostility towards Islam itself. Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis 
issued a statement on September 16, 2013 saying “this is a stage [the period after 
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Morsi’s deposition] when the enemies of Islam gather, seculars and deviants, hypocrites 
and crusaders inside together with outside in terms of Jews and western crusaders in a 
total warfare against Islam in Egypt and its spearhead in it are the Egypt and its 
spearhead in it are the Egyptian criminal police and army” (Burgrova, 2014). The 
military-backed government declared a nation-wide war on terror, which was interpreted 
by Jihadists as a war against all forms of Islam that are not perceived as moderate. State 
media and anti-Muslim Brotherhood outlets have alleged that the Muslim Brotherhood 
have taken advantage of personal contacts to militants and have used them as a tool to 
regain political power (Burgrova, 2014).  
 Only two days after Morsi was removed, emergency rule was declared in the 
northern Sinai and strict security measures were enforced, such as curfews starting at 
4pm or shoot-to-kill policies around security checkpoints and security compounds 
(Burgrova, 2014). Violence and tension did not de-escalate once General al-Sisi took 
power. The army launched a counter-terrorism campaign and twenty five unarmed 
conscripts were killed execution style when their bus was ambushed on the way back to 
their barracks (Burgrova, 2014). Al-Sisi’s administration blamed the Muslim 
Brotherhood for being responsible for the attacks and terrorism in Egypt in general. The 
most active militant group (Jamaat Ansar al-Maqdis) claimed responsibility for the recent 
attacks but they stated they are not aligned with any political groups, undermining the 
government’s argument. Even though militant groups in Egypt appear to be political 
neutral, their targets show a pattern, with the targets being police and military personnel 




IIc. Problems in the Sinai 
After Israel gave the Sinai back to Egypt in 1982, Egypt never had full sovereign 
control over the territory and it became important for the tourism industry mostly in the 
southern coast (Burgrova, 2014). Egypt is only allowed to deploy limited number of 
security and military forces as well as certain types of weaponry in four different zones. 
Several areas in the Sinai are critically underdeveloped and lacking basic infrastructure 
and services due to lack of state investment. Besides the income from seaside tourist 
resorts, the Sinai is one of the most economically and politically marginalized regions in 
Egypt (Burgrova, 2014). The local population consists of Bedouins. State media and 
officials portrayed Bedouins as criminals, smugglers, and spies, along with categorizing 
them as second-class citizens. Laws were passed to ban Bedouins from owning land or 
joining armed forces and the nomad population did not benefit from revenue generated 
by the tourism industry (Burgrova, 2014). 
 Compared to protestors in Cairo and other parts of Egypt, protestors in Sinai were 
armed and the protests lasted longer.  Police stations were prime targets for Bedouins. As 
a result, police withdrew from the streets in the northern parts of the Sinai. Since police 
started becoming targets for attacks, they have shown little to no ambition in retaking 
their positions and returning to the streets to enforce the law (Burgrova, 2014). Between 
the uprising of 2011 and June 2013, security forces were targeted randomly. Majority of 
attacks were aimed specifically at police and military targets. Even though the security 
situation was slowly getting worse, the Egyptian military and Morsi’s administration did 
not attempt to intervene until there was an attack on Rafah, an Egyptian city that borders 
the Gaza Strip (Burgrova, 2014). The attack happened in August 2012, where a group of 
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masked gunmen killed sixteen Egyptian border guards. After Rafah, the Egyptian 
military launched operation “Eagle” and their target were the Bedouins. The operation 
resulted in the Bedouins being subjected to raids, interrogations, torture and arrests 
without due process (Burgrova, 2014). When Morsi ran to get elected, one of the issues in 
his platform was to include Bedouins into Egyptian society and that goal never succeeded 
as a result of operation Eagle.  
The Sinai has the most terrorist attacks in Egypt. In 2013, there were 225 attacks 
and 67% of these attacks took place in the Sinai, specifically in the north. In 2014, the 
total number of attacks dropped to 80 or 38% of total attacks (Chenessau & Azzam, 
2015). Despite the pledge of allegiance by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (‘Supporters of the 
Holy House’) to the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) in November 2014, Al 
Qaeda Central (AQC) has continued to spread their influence in Egypt since the 
overthrow of President Morsi (Chenessau & Azzam, 2015). AQC wanted affiliates in the 
Sinai to “offer sanctuary to their brothers, the Mujahedeen”. ISIS attempted to expand 
their influence in Egypt through the Sinai. In April 2014, Egyptian military officials 
mentioned that some senior ISIS operatives could be relocating to the Sinai Peninsula 
(Chenessau & Azzam, 2015).  Another group, Ajnad Misr (‘Soldiers of Egypt’) is a 
Salafi-jihadist group based in Giza who target government personnel and assets. They 
have pledged allegiance to al Qaeda leadership, but group members have little to no 
knowledge on the global jihad ideology and its implications (Chenessau & Azzam, 2015). 
The group carried out fifteen attacks in Cairo in 2014 and has the potential to motivate or 
radicalize other young Egyptians to carry out attacks. Egyptian forces saw a change in 
militant tactics when jihadists started using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 
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to overwhelm defensive forces followed by taking control of terrain. After the initial 
suicide attacks, militants would use technicals, which are fighting vehicles with mounted 
heavy machine guns (Stratfor Analysis, 2015). The militants’ use of anti-aircraft guns, 
anti-tank missiles and mortars forced the Egyptian military to respond with F-16 fighter 
jets instead of Apache helicopters for air support. The exact number of casualties for both 
the militants and Egyptian army varies depending on the source (Stratfor Analysis, 2015).  
 Since mid-2013, Egyptian tactics against terrorist elements included air strikes, 
dismantling safe houses, and finding weapons and explosives caches (Chenessau & 
Azzam, 2015). During the Mubarak administration, peace in the Sinai has been 
maintained by cooperation between the government and Bedouin tribes. The Bedouins 
provided security for industrial sites and pipelines, along with being a mediator for tribal 
crises (Chenessau & Azzam, 2015). Trust between the Egyptian government and the 
Bedouins started to fail once Bedouin leaders were being assassinated by terrorist groups 
over the years, along with Mubarak’s regime losing control on the overall security 
situation along with diminishing intelligence capabilities in the peninsula (Chenessau & 
Azzam, 2015). President Sisi uses harsh measures to combat terrorism and criticism of 
his regime. Since Morsi was ousted, security forces have repeatedly used excessive force 
resulting in unlawful killings. The judicial system has handed down death sentences and 







Comparing Terrorist attack injuries/deaths in Egypt to U.S Military Aid to Egypt  




$1.3 $1.31 $1.24 $1.31 $1.31 $1.31 
Deaths 27 20 160 93 782 291 
Injuries 106 106 453 315 922 375 
 
The following data in this graph is from two different sources. The dollar amount for aid 
is from foreignassistance.gov. The terror attack data on injuries and deaths are from the 
Global Terrorism. On October 31, 2015, a Russian passenger jet carrying 224 people was 
downed over the Sinai Peninsula by terrorist group Wilayat Sinai using an explosive 
hidden in a can of pineapple juice (Dearden, 2016). Earlier in 2015, 21 Egyptian Coptic 
Christians were kidnapped and eventually beheaded on a beach. Conflict has not resided 
in 2016 between the Egyptian military and different Islamic groups in the Sinai. The data 
from the above table shows Egypt has been receiving a steady amount of aid consistently 
over a billion dollars since Mubarak was removed from power. The majority of this aid is 
military aid. Giving Egypt a billion dollars in aid does not solve the terrorism problem, 





IId. Constraints the Egyptian military faces 
 During September 2013, the Egyptian military increased their efforts towards 
Jihadists components in the Sinai. The army had some success but they had three major 
constraints (Burgrova, 2014). The first constraint was the army had limited personnel and 
weaponry in the region due to provisions from the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 
(Burgrova, 2014). Egyptian limitations were exposed when there was a funeral for four 
members of Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Hundreds of fellow fighters and Jihadist 
fugitives attended the funeral and were able to leave without anyone being apprehended 
because security forces were worried they would be outnumbered (Burgrova, 2014). The 
second constraint is the fact that the Egyptian army is not equipped or trained to fight a 
counter-insurgent campaign in a desert mountainous area. United States military 
equipment given to Egypt, being tanks and F-16 fighter jets are not effective against 
small, mobile group of militants (Burgrova, 2014). The third constraint is the extensive 
damage that collateral damage has had on the local population. The locals are more 
willing to support local jihadi groups. Sinai cleric Sheikh Hamdin Abu Fasil described 
operation Eagle under Morsi as: “Instead of coming with water and food to the Bedouin, 
they [the government] came with heavy weapons to drive the Bedouin from the desert. 
This increases the tension and turns the region into a barrel of a gun that can blow up at 
any time” (Burgrova, 2014). The longer the “iron fist” mentality continues, the longer 
Bedouins will cooperate with Jihadist groups. The combinations of the Bedouins’ 
knowledge of the terrain along with the militants’ “know how” and tactics with planning 
terrorist attacks can become a problem for Egypt’s tourism industry and Egypt’s 
relationship with Israel.   
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New anti-terrorism laws were enacted in November 2014. These laws expanded 
the definition of terrorism, putting human rights at risk (Chenessau & Azzam, 2015). The 
new terrorism laws define terrorism as actions that could obstruct the work of public 
officials, universities, mosques, embassies, or international institutions. Anyone 
convicted on belonging to any group that “harm national unity or social peace” may be 
sentenced up to 10 years in prison (Chenessau & Azzam, 2015). Any social activist has 
the potential to be labeled a terrorist by the Sisi regime.  
 The Sinai is not an isolate issue, but instead a regional problem with potential to 
destabilize the region. After the 2011 uprising, Israel faced multiple cross-border attacks 
and infiltration attempts carried out by Sinai-based militants (Burgrova, 2014). Israel 
responded with deploying troops along the southern borders. While goals towards Israel 
in terms of destruction were not met, the presence of troops in southern Israel took a toll 
on Israeli tourism revenues (Burgrova, 2014).  
III. Terror groups in Libya  
In 2015, ISIS in Libya created two strongholds outside their base in Iraq and Syria. 
The first base was in the Sinai and the second base is in north-central Libya in the city of 
Sirte. The Islamic State’s goal is to transform Libya into a terrorism safe haven where 
they can train operators and launch operations into sub-Saharan Africa and Southern 
Europe (terrorisminfo, 2016). The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism information 
Center assess ISIS in Libya is more of a regional and international threat than the 
franchise in Iraq and Syria.  
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 The Islamic State (IS) secured a stronghold in Sirte, a coastal city with an 
approximate population of 60,000. Sirte is home to governmental-economic 
infrastructure, including banks, roads, a port, and military bases (terrorisminfo, 2016). 
Once Qaddafi fell, Ansar al-Sharia filled the political vacuum. IS operatives went to Sirte 
in pickup trucks with mounted guns and took over the city with little to no resistance. 
ISIS controlled Sirte with a small force of fighters ranging from 200-400 fighters. ISIS 
preserved control by enforcing a strict Salafist Islamic code on the local populace 
(terrorisminfo, 2016). Violators were beheaded in the main square, internet access was 
supervised and restricted and coed education was forbidden. Islamic State established a 
police force to oversee law and order, patrol neighborhoods and be a mediator between 
tribes and families, if necessary (terrorisminfo, 2016).   
 Some notable attacks by the Islamic State include the attack on the Corinthia hotel 
on January 27, 2015. The Corinthia is a luxury hotel, visited by government officials and 
foreigners because it is used for government activity (terrorisminfo, 2016). The attack 
started with a car bomb that exploded near the hotel. Gunmen entered the hotel and killed 
ten people. The gunmen were identified as Sudanese and Tunisian. The motive behind 
the attack was to damage the prestige and governance of the Islamic Tripoli government 
and kill foreign diplomats, including Libyan government officials and militia operatives 
who visit the hotel (terrorisminfo, 2016). During 2015, ISIS carried out multiple attacks 
against foreign embassies in Libya. These attacks resulted in little to no casualties 
because embassies were abandoned due to the instability. The motivation behind the 
attacks were to glorify ISIS, damage the image of the Islamic government in Tripoli, and 
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send a threatening message to countries whose embassies were attacked (terrorisminfo, 
2016).  
Table 1.2 
Comparing Terrorist attack injuries/deaths in Libya to U.S Military Aid to Libya 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Dollar amount 
(millions) 
$30.0 $5.39 $30.71 $5.49 $4.15 $9.5 
Deaths 28 28 184 519 460 382 
Injuries 35 35 582 780 685 395 
 
The data to the above table is provided by foreignassistance.gov and the Global 
Terrorism Database. The above data shows the sporadic amount of military aid from 
2011 to 2016. The amount of terrorist related deaths and injuries has consistently been on 
the rise.  
IIIa. Human trafficking fueling ISIS economy in Libya 
Historically, the Sahara has been a pipeline for smuggling for over a thousand years 
and Libya has always been a key destination and transit point for black market trade. 
Since the fall of Qaddafi, the smuggling and trafficking business involving armed jihadist 
groups and organized crime has increased exponentially (Globaliniative, 2015). The flow 
of money and arms from Libya has had consequences for northern Africa including 
facilitating the rebellion in Mali in 2010 and continue to be a source for conflict in Egypt 
and Libya today. The more lucrative trade in Libya is the migrant trade, valued at $255-
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323 million a year (Globaliniative, 2015). The Libyan arms trade post-Qaddafi is valued 
in the range of $15-30 million annually with most of the arms being purchased by 
militant groups in Libya and the Sahel (Mali, Niger, and Chad) (Globaliniative, 2015). In 
2011, Qaddafi’s armed forces had approximately 76,000 active duty personnel and 
40,000 reserve units held 250,000-700,000 firearms, of which 75% were estimated to be 
assault rifles. Assault rifles sell for approximately $150-1,000; while more advanced 
weaponry like surface-to-air missiles, sell for tens of thousands of dollars apiece 
(Globaliniative, 2015). The arms trade in Libya is estimated at $4-15 million for light 
arms, with ammunition it ranges from $15-30 million. The true value is difficult to obtain 
because of the difficulty to sometimes track the weapons being smuggled. Migrant 
smuggling has increased from Libya along with Tunisia. During Qaddafi’s rule, Libya 
had an agreement with Italy regarding the amount of seaborne refugees (Globaliniative, 
2015). In 2010, 4,500 seaborne refugees were picked up in 2010. By 2014, the number 
rose to at least 170,000 despite the increased instability in Libya and the danger of 
crossing the Mediterranean. Forced and illegal migration has become one of the largest 
sources of income in Libya and many groups are profiting (Globaliniative, 2015). 
Smugglers usually charge $800-1,000 per person for passage from Sub-Saharan Africa to 
Libya, then an additional $1,500-1,900 across the Mediterranean. To reach Libya, Syrian 
refugees would enter either Egypt or Sudan, two countries that did not require visas for 
Syrian citizens. Under Morsi’s presidency, refugees were welcomed in Egypt 
(Globaliniative, 2015). Once al-Sisi took power, refugees were pushed to use routes south 
into the Sinai, where the government control is weak to non-existent. This creates a 
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market for the Islamic State to facilitate the flow of migrants into Libya thus creating a 
cash flow that is used to purchase weapons and finance operations (Globaliniative, 2015).  
IIIb. Ansar al-Sharia in Libya 
The successful expansion of ISIS in Libya would not have been possible without 
the alliance of Ansar al-Sharia (ASL). ASL is described as an insurgent, non-state actor, 
religious, social services provider, violent terrorist group. From an ideological point of 
view, ASL is an Islamist, Jihadist, Salafist, and Sunni group. The main goal of ASL is to 
implement sharia law in Libya (counterextremism, 2017).  ASL is comprised of two 
smaller groups, the Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Benghazi (ASB) and Ansar al-Sharia 
Derna (ASD), each group formed in 2011 after the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar 
Gaddafi. ASL was responsible for the U.S consulate attack in Benghazi which killed four 
Americans, including the U.S ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens 
(counterextremism, 2017). After the Benghazi attack, ASB was forced out of Benghazi 
and ASD was dismantled. ASB changed their image and started to publicly denounce 
violence. ASL launched a dawa, or charitable campaign where they provided social 
services and charity in Benghazi (counterextremism, 2017). This campaign was 
successful and won back the trust of Libyans which allowed ASL to open branches in 
Derna, Sirte, and Ajdabiya. Foreign and local intelligence groups have revealed that since 
2012, ASL has strengthened ties with international violent jihadist groups by holding 
clandestine meetings with al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and training and exporting 
fighters to Syria, Iraq, and Mali (counterextremism, 2017). Like other jihadist groups, 
ASL uses social media to recruit. The organization has Facebook, Twitter, and Google 
accounts but their pages are often taken down. Through social media, ASL features their 
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outreach and social service campaigns. Recruits are drawn to the group for their charity 
work and preaching. ASL has recruiters in foreign countries. Recruiters have directed 
Tunisian citizens who want to fight in Syria towards training camps in Libya. ASL also 
uses money to recruit young fighters. ASL’s training camps in Libya host fighters from 
other organizations. Since Libyan General Khalifa Haftar announced a major offensive 
against armed Islamist groups in eastern Libya in May 2014 (codenamed Operation 
Dignity), ASL changed their strategy from gaining support through charity and social 
work to conducting military action (Zelin, 2015). ASL copied the model of Ansar al-
Sharia in Tunisia by viewing their outreach and social services campaign as an important 
part of building not only an Islamic society, but an eventual Islamic State governed by 
interpretations of Sharia (Islamic law) (Zelin, 2015). ASL is a complex terrorist 
organization with multiple identities. On one hand, they are a charity, security service, a 
health service, and a religious education provider. On the other hand they are a 
functioning militia, terrorist organization and a training base for foreign fighters (Zelin, 
2015). After the Arab Spring, countries that experienced a significant political shift, 
particularly Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia represented a “fresh start” for a new jihadist 
campaign after al-Qaeda in Iraq failed to control territory and institute sharia law (Zelin, 
2015). In an audio message, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri thought this 
environment provided an opportunity “for dawa and informing…Only God knows for 
how long they [local governments and the West] will continue, so the people of Islam and 
Jihad should benefit from them and exploit them” (Zelin, 2015). The “dawa first” 
strategy worked initially when ASL and AST were recruiting members at an 
unprecedented level. Over the past few years, this strategy has slowed down, particularly 
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in Egypt. Within a month of al-Sisi gaining power in 2013, all the key members of ASE 
had either been arrested or forced to join Jama’at Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in northern Sinai. 
ASL launched an international dawa campaign targeting Syria, Sudan, and Gaza (Zelin, 
2015). This began in November 2012 when ASL sent aid to Syria and Gaza. Since the 
fighting with Libyan forces started, ASL has stopped their international aid campaign.  
 Ansar al-Sharia will continue to fight against the ideology of democracy in Libya 
and Egypt because democracy establishes an adversary to the shura (council), or Islamic 
governance (Zelin, 2015). According to ASL, democracy is fundamentally incompatible 
with Islam. ASL associates liberal values found in democratic societies as “lust”. ASL 
views democracy as full of “provisions and deceitful illusions”. ASL argues that the 
United States’ definition of “terrorism” is used as a label for those who do not agree with 
the “democratic” agenda. ASL calls for a movement among Muslims to be educated on 
“the goals of these belligerent states and their allies” (Zelin, 2015). ASL’s goal is to 
indoctrinate their fighters with the belief they are defending their religion and way of life 
and to be constantly in a state of war with the United States. ASL believes Libya is 
suffering from humiliation and disgrace because it abandoned “governing with Islamic 
Sharia” (Zelin, 2015).  
IV. Conclusion 
My conclusion is United States military aid to both Egypt and Libya is not effective 
in fighting terrorism. The security situation in Libya continues to be a problem and will 
always be the driving force in preventing any progress from being made. Not only did the 
Obama administration not actively assist post-revolution in Libya, very little military aid 
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was delivered to forces fighting Islamic extremists. As a result of this, the Islamic State 
was able to seize and control various oil fields throughout the country preventing 
economic progress being made. Due to lack of economic opportunities, groups like Ansar 
al-Sharia have been successful in infiltrating the local populace and gaining support by 
providing various charities the main one including providing an education. While Egypt 
is not on the brink of becoming a weak state like Libya is, Egypt has been consistently 
receiving over a billion dollars in military aid for the past five years. The problem in the 
Sinai Peninsula is not going away mainly because of Egyptian military strategy and law 
















Chapter 3: U.S Economic Aid to Egypt and Libya 
I. Introduction 
 The United States believes assisting Libya and Egypt economically will increase 
their chances of achieving stability and finally creating a stable democratic government. 
Contrary to the United States’ beliefs regarding restoring economic prosperity to both of 
my case studies, American economic aid has been unsuccessful. This chapter will show 
there is economic potential for both of my cases, along with how interconnected it is to 
my dependent variables. This chapter will show Libya lacks direction and diversification 
for economic success, while USAID is attempting to improve Egypt’s private sector. The 
data in this chapter will show little to no success has been achieved for both cases.  
II. Libya  
For the past several years, the world’s attention has been fixated on North Africa and 
the Middle East (MENA) because the region is failing at addressing historical problems 
and offering a path for political and economic stability for current and future generations 
(Global Employment Trends, 2014). Political tensions in Libya have resulted in a flow of 
migrants into countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia. Economic growth 
has slowed down in the region, falling to 2.2 per cent in 2013, well below the global 
average (Global Employment Trends, 2014). Youth unemployment in MENA is the 
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highest in the world, reaching 27.2 percent in the Middle East and 29 percent in North 
Africa in 2013. Foreign investment has not made a significant improvement in the 
economic status of the region. This can be explained by only certain sectors receiving 
economic aid such as the hydrocarbon industry (Global Employment Trends, 2014). The 
hydrocarbon industry is a capital intensive industry and offers jobs only for certain skill 
sets, such as petroleum engineers, which need to be imported from other countries. The 
local populace did not benefit from foreign investment towards labor-intensive sectors 
like construction, because jobs were quickly filled by migrants. While both countries 
have credible security threats to their economic growth, Egypt is taking appropriate steps 
to secure foreign investments from the international community. While the United States 
and its allies are looking at investing into Libya’s public sector, the United States is 
looking mainly to invest in Egypt’s private sector. Egypt’s aid from the United States is 
being released in parts and must meet certain requirements first, which will be explained 
later in the chapter.  
IIa. U.S aid to Libya 
The U.S State Department recognized Libya has the potential to stabilize 
economically, however, division among all political, economic and security groups 
will prevent further economic success. 
The U.S State Department released a Joint Communique on Libya stating: 
“We support the fulfillment of the LPA’s mandate to keep oil infrastructure, 
production, and export under the exclusive control of the National Oil Corporation 
(NOC) acting under the authority of the PC. All oil revenues generated by the NOC must 
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be transferred to the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), which must put the funds at the 
disposal of the PC. We support Prime Minister al-Sarraj’s call for dialogue to reduce 
tensions in the oil crescent and applaud his leadership in this regard. We welcome the 
recent transfer of the oil facilities in the oil crescent to the NOC as well as the plans to 
increase oil production and exports” (U.S State Department, 2016). 
 The U.S State Department views Libya’s economic institutions, including the 
NOC, CBL, and Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), as institutions that must function to 
benefit all Libyans. The Presidency Council possesses the power to preserve and protect 
Libyan resources for the benefit of the Libyan people. The State Department is intent on 
working with the Presidency Council to stabilize and reconstruct Sirte. Areas recently 
liberated from are a high priority and the Presidency Council (PC) is encouraged to 
inaugurate the Benghazi Reconstruction Fund (U.S State Department, 2016).  
Libya’s economic problems are taking a turn for the worse as rival governments 
and militias continue to fight for decreasing national wealth. Oil fields, pipelines, and 
export terminals, along with boardrooms of financial institutions are being affected 
(CrisisGroup, 2015). Since 2011, economic progress has been bogged down by attacks, 
labor strikes, and armed takeovers of oil and gas facilities. The takeovers show the 
increased power of militias and the failure to include them into the national security 
sector. The oil and gas facilities have also posed as targets of revenue for the Islamic 
State (CrisisGroup, 2015). The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and National Oil Company 
(NOC) are under control of the Tripoli government, the internationally recognized 
parliament in Tobruk and its government in al-Bayda is trying to establish similar 
institutions. The Libyan economy is being eroded by corruption and mismanagement. 
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Along with reduced oil prices, damage to production and export sites and other 
infrastructure blockades, corrective action appears urgent (CrisisGroup, 2015). The next 
several paragraphs will illustrate how intertwined both the security and economic 
situations are. 
Development programs are created to encourage sustainable broad-based 
economic progress and social stability in developing countries. U.S aid of this kind is 
managed by the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) and is used for 
long-term projects in a variety of economic areas (USAID, 2016). Some programs within 
USAID include agriculture programs to focus on reducing poverty and hunger, adding 
opportunities for farmers, and reliable farming practices for sustainable agriculture. 
Private sector development programs focus on support for small businesses that lack 
access to banking (USAID, 2016). While natural resources offer a promising future to 
any country that has an abundance of them, Libya’s natural resources are a source of 
conflict and are a “curse”.    
IIb. Problems with the Libyan Economy 
 Libya’s resources are the cause of the conflict that has worsened since July 2014. 
Qaddafi was effective in maintaining control over Libya by distributing money made 
from oil. Once Qaddafi was removed from power, oil and economic production steadily 
decreased and by July 2013, oil and gas facilities were on the brink of shutting down. Oil 
exports went from 1.4 million barrels a day to 200,000 barrels a day (CrisisGroup, 2015). 
Government contracts were paid without delivery of goods or services and politicians 
secured credit from banks to import goods that were not delivered or were delivered in 
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small quantities than specified. Public-sector wages increased due to payroll fraud 
(CrisisGroup, 2015). Out of the eighteen billion dollars allocated for 2013 salaries, just 
over three and a half billion dollars were estimated to have gone to persons fraudulently 
on public payroll (CrisisGroup, 2015). The battle for Libya’s natural resources can be 
divided into two periods. The first period dating from late 2012 to mid-2014, saw 
employees of oil and gas pipelines pressing the central government for salaries 
(CrisisGroup, 2015).  
This changed when Operation Libya Dawn was launched in July 2014 to remove 
militias from Tripoli International airport which was seized in August 2011. Most 
stoppages resulted from short protests such as: employees of Benghazi-based state-run 
Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO) forced closure of headquarters following dispute 
over company management temporarily stopping sales. Fighters injured in the 2011 
revolution blocked an oil refinery in Zawiya, west of Tripoli due to lack of medical care. 
Demonstrators blocked oil fields in the southwest demanding jobs and training for local 
residents or new equipment for security forces (CrisisGroup, 2015). Other stoppages that 
challenged hydrocarbon resource management included the inability to incorporate 
revolutionary brigades into a national security sector.  
 Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia (2015) say Libya’s economy is dependent on 
exhaustible and volatile hydrocarbon resources. Libya’s natural resources constitute a 
majority of their government revenue. Libya has one of the largest hydrocarbon reserves 
in the world with crude oil reserves of 47 billion barrels and 53 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas as of the end of 2010 (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). The hydrocarbon 
sector accounts for 65% of GDP and 95% of total fiscal revenue. The dependency of the 
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hydrocarbon sector was made evident during the revolution when production fell from 
1.69 million barrels per day in 2010 to 0.48 million barrels in 2011, leading to a 62% 
decrease in GDP (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). Resource wealth has given Libya 
the opportunity for development, but Libya faces noteworthy constraints of absorption 
capacity and intergenerational equity. The main problem within the Libyan economy is 
the mismanagement of resource revenues. To prepare for the day when Libya’s 
hydrocarbon reserves run out, the government has to run surpluses during times where 
market prices are high and invest in alternative sources, like financial assets and public 
investments that add to the economy’s productive capacity (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 
2015). Investing during surpluses in oil prices can be used during periods of low 
production which will protect the economy against unstable oil prices, promote a 
balanced and diversified economic growth, and improve intergenerational equity in 
resource wealth (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). Libya’s budget design lacks a clear 
policy or developmental strategy and weak connection between policy priorities and 
expenditures. The budget is for a single year on a cash basis and does not provide 
information about macroeconomic parameters such as real GDP growth and inflation 
(Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). The budget follows two separate and uncoordinated 
processes at both the central and line ministry levels.  
 Auty (1993) highlighted the under-performance of resource abundant and 
extracting countries compared to non-resource abundant countries. Empirical studies 
showed an opposite correlation between economic growth and natural resource 
abundance among developing countries and the Libyan economy is no exception to this 
study (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). Although Libya has been a substantial 
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producer of crude oil since the 60’s, it shows lower economic and social indicators when 
compared with other developing oil and non-oil producing economies (Cevik, 
Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). The energy sector in Libya is important not only for 
domestic development, but for international markets as well. Oil sector is expected to 
generate significant future revenue, crucial for reconstruction of Libya’s economy, 
infrastructure, and execution of sustainable growth (Cevik, Fenochietto & Gracia, 2015). 
Energy sector in post Qaddafi Libya is important for the global economy and European 
countries because the majority of Libyan crude oil and natural gas has been sold to 
Europe. 
 Libya’s current financial forecast looks bleak. In 2014, their deficit was $16.4 
billion or 44% of the GDP and the balance of payment deficit was $22 billion. An 
anonymous IMF official estimated the 2015 deficit ranging from $14.4-21.6 billion, 
which makes up 42-68% of their GDP (CrisisGroup, 2015). The low oil prices will 
increase the stress on reserves. In the first nine months of 2015, reserves dropped $15.4 
billion, an improvement compared to the $31.2 billion drop in 2014. A short term plan for 
stabilizing finances include agreement by rival camps on two measures (CrisisGroup, 
2015).  Oil and gas production have to increase and maintain a unified financial system. 
In areas where infrastructure has not been damaged, but production has stopped, like the 
Sharara and al-Fil oil fields in the south west, Libyan and international actors should 
broker ceasefires to reopen oil fields in the southwest, Libyan and international actors 
should broker ceasefires to reopen oil fields and pipelines (CrisisGroup, 2015). In areas 
with extensive damage like the Sidra port, security guarantees should be negotiated to 





Egyptian and Libyan GDP from 2011-2015 (Billions of US Dollars) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Egypt $236 $276.35 $286 $301.5 $330.78 
Libya $34.7 $81.91 $65.51 $41.14 $29.15 
 
The above graph indicates a steady decline in Libya’s GDP since 2012 (source: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/libya/gdp) 
III. The Case of Egypt 
 The relationship between Egypt and the United States regarding economic aid has 
gone through different stages throughout the years. In the mid-1970s, the United States 
looked to expand their relationship with Egypt, encourage peace with Israel, and promote 
a capitalist economy (Sharp, 2015). In the mid to late 1990s Egypt went from an 
impoverished country to a low-middle class income economy and both countries started 
to rethink the assistance relationship, emphasizing “trade not aid”. The Bush 
administration requested congress to cut aid to Egypt in half in 2009 to $200 million 
(Sharp, 2015). From 2010 to 2013 congress gave Egypt $250 million. ESF stands for the 
U.S-Egyptian Enterprise Fund. Currently there are no bilateral agreements between the 
United States and Egypt on overall levels of economic assistance. U.S economic aid to 
Egypt is divided into two parts: (1) USAID programs like public health, education, 
economic development and (2) Egypt’s economy and national budget has stabilized with 
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help of Gulf Arab monarchies who injected billions of dollars into the Egyptian economy 
and treasure, providing grants, loans, and fuel imports (Sharp, 2015). Government 
spending continues to outpace revenue, leader to larger deficits. Egyptian officials have 
attempted to persuade the international community that Egypt is a safe investment. The 
Central Bank has devalued the Egyptian pound, and the government has started major 
infrastructure projects, like an $8.5 billion expansion of the Suez Canal, a project 
expected to triple revenue (Sharp, 2015). Various economists assess that Egypt needs $60 
billion in foreign direct investment over the next four years to consistently maintain a five 
percent growth rate.  
 In late 2011, Congress passed P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2012, it authorized the creation of an enterprise fund for Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. The 
goal of this fund was to further develop Egypt’s private sector, especially in the 
agricultural sector by making investments in small to medium-sized businesses or 
providing entrepreneurs with loans and technical assistance (Sharp, 2015). In November 
2012, the State Department notified Congress of their intent to spend $60 million. 
Another $60 million to the fund was sent to Congress in October 2013.   The fund was 
formally launched under the Morsi administration; some members of Congress were 
concerned about plans to expand U.S-Egyptian economic cooperation. In the fall of 2012, 
Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Representative Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen placed an informal hold on the initial $60 million ESF obligation, which was 
later lifted (Sharp, 2015). In 2013, after the military removed Morsi from power, Senator 
Lindsey Graham placed a hold on the second payment of $60 million in ESF “until he 
sees Egypt moving towards democracy”. Senator Graham’s spokesman added that the 
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Senator believes American taxpayers deserve a much clearer explanation of what exactly 
is President Obama’s policy towards Egypt” (Sharp, 2015). Senator Graham lifted his 
hold in early December 2013 just as Egypt’s amended constitution was made public in 
preparation for their national referendum on its adoption. The FY2015 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act contained a number of conditions on U.S assistance to Egypt similar 
to what Congress included in 2014 with one exception: an executive branch national 
security waiver which allows the removal of limits places by Congress that would 
prevent the provision of 2014-2015 assistance to Egypt until the Secretary of State 
certifies Egypt’s government meets “democracy-based conditions” (Sharp, 2015). On 
May 12, 2015, Secretary Kerry authorized to provide aid to Egypt because he determined 
aid to Egypt was important to national security interest of the United States. The FY2015 
Act requires that funds may only be made available if Secretary Kerry certifies Egypt is 
sustaining a strategic relationship with the United States and is meeting their obligations 
under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. The funds provided to Egypt “notwithstanding 
any other provision of law,” an exemption that would allow aid despite a clause that 
prevents foreign assistance to a country whose elected head of government is removed by 
military coup d’état or decree (Sharp, 2015).  For FY2015, if the Secretary of State 
cannot verify democracy-based conditions mentioned in the act and chooses not to use 
the national security waiver, military aid may be available at a minimum rate necessary to 
existing contracts, except defense articles and services from contracts cannot be delivered 
until certification requirements are met (Sharp, 2015). Another provision in the FY2015 
Act requires the Secretary of State to report on any defense articles withheld from 
delivery to Egypt. The report must include detailed descriptions of conditions the 
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Government of Egypt must meet to continue the delivery of military equipment. For 
FY2016, both the House and Senate drafted foreign operation bills which would provide 
the President’s full request for Egypt up to $1.3 billion in FMF and $150 million in ESF. 
Unlike the prior two appropriation acts (FY2014-FY2015), FY 2016 bill does not possess 
the need for verification for proof the Egyptian government is transitioning towards 
democracy. The FY2016 bill requires Secretary Kerry to report to lawmakers on issues 
regarding elections, governing democratically, and advancing minority rights (2016). The 
FY2016 bill allows the Secretary of State to waive certification requirement if aid to 
Egypt is deemed as a national security interest.  
Table 2.2  
Egypt vs. Libya USAID Economic Aid (Millions of US Dollars) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Egypt $256.81 $94.64 $340.75 $181.63 $222.62 $97.28 
Libya $93.81 $67.70 $22.10 $49.60 $14.99 $16.62 
 
The data to this table was provided by USAID’s website in their “trends” section: 
explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html. The following data shows an overall negative trend in 
the amount of aid. 2013-2014 were particularly bad years for both cases. These years had 
the most instability overall. Although Egypt’s economic aid can be described as sporadic, 
Egypt’s GDP per capita has improved and Egypt’s unemployment has either stabilized or 
slightly decreased. The bottom row represents an overall negative trend for Libya. The 
overall struggle in Libya towards a stable government and economy is reflected in the aid 
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amount. Aid amounts will not be increased during times of instability because this is seen 
as an unsafe investment. The bottom table shows unemployment rates in Egypt has been 
stable compared to the rates in Libya.  
According to USAID, over 800,000 job seekers enter the Egyptian labor market 
annually, but businesses not been able to keep up with job demand. Unemployment in 
Egypt was 5.2% in 1980s and since then has steadily risen to 12.8%. The majority of 
Egyptians seeking work look for employment with small and medium enterprises as they 
make up more than 95% of private enterprises and over 80% of private sector 
employment in Egypt (USAID, 2016). USAID views the growth and profitability of 
small and medium sized businesses as essential to creating jobs for women and youth as 
well as promoting trade and investment to increase growth rates (USAID, 2016). USAID 
looks to improve business and monitor the environment to promote private sector 
competiveness. They face a complicated, time-consuming process for registering 
businesses, securing operating licenses, and complying with tax requirements. USAID 
looks to address these constraints and assist in growing small businesses into medium-
sized enterprises and ultimately to mature, thriving enterprises (USAID, 2016). 
Secondary schools in Egypt do not provide students with marketable skills to enhance 
their chances of employability. USAID looks to help secondary schools improve their 
capability to provide students with these skills through improved technical education 
systems (USAID, 2016). Another constraint Egypt faces for economic growth is a lack of 
private sector innovation and growth through entrepreneurship. Egyptian schools do not 
focus on critical thinking needed for establishing start-ups that meet market needs. 
Entrepreneurs lack access to market information and services that would assist in making 
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up the deficit (USAID, 2016). USAID is working with the Egyptian private sector to 
improve small businesses’ access to technology, market information, and help new 
businesses grow into more sophisticated entities that meet market demand.  Since 2012, 
more than 12,000 entrepreneurs have been trained, leading to 149 companies generating 
new jobs. Registration times for new businesses improved, assisting business owners to 
start their businesses, generate profit, create jobs and contribute to the economy (USAID, 
2016). Since 2012, 15,000 technical school instructors have been trained and twenty five 
career centers at vocational schools have helped 8,000 graduates gain employment.  
Table 2.3 
Unemployment percentages between Egypt and Libya  
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Egypt 12% 12.7% 13.2% 12.9% 12.9% 12.6% 
Libya 17.1% 14.8% 13.8% 19.3% 14.4% 16% 
 
The data is in this table is provided by the following websites: 
theglobaleconomy.com/Egypt/Unemployment_rate/, ieconomics.com/Libya-









I assess with high confidence the political and security climate Libya and Egypt 
will undermine both unilateral and multilateral economic efforts and foreign aid will not 
be effective, whether from the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), or the European Union (EU). Even if the United States gave Libya as much 
economic aid as they give Egypt, I believe the result would still be the same. Libya lacks 
the fundamentals for an economy to build upon. The Libyan economy is reliable upon 
natural resources and lacks diversification. Because Egypt’s economy is based more in 
the private sector, it makes foreign investments more attractive. The security situation in 
Libya is affecting foreign investments. Libya’s oil production has plummeted since the 
revolution was over and Islamic militants took control of various oil fields.  The lack of 
organization makes planning future investments and economic projects obsolete. While 
the process for registering businesses, securing business licenses, and tax requirements 
can be complicated and time consuming, USAID is taking the right steps in Egypt to 
improve the private sector. Egypt has an economic environment that has potential for 
growth. USAID is giving money to Egypt to send their students to technical schools in 
attempts to cut down on unemployment and creating potential for more businesses to be 









Chapter 4: Political Stability and Democracy in Egypt and Libya 
I. Introduction 
During this chapter, I examine political stability in both Egypt and Libya. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show the similarities and differences between both cases and 
what makes each of them unique, along with explaining why Egypt is stable and Libya is 
not. American foreign aid, both military and economic, does not assist in stabilizing 
political institutions in Libya and in Egypt. The chapter starts with examining pre and 
post-Arab Spring American foreign policy and how it affects Egypt and Libya. Next, I 
will discuss the current political climate in Libya and Egypt followed by why Libya is a 
weak state and what it will take to stabilize Libya. I will conclude the chapter by 
comparing and contrasting U.S efforts in both countries and indicators of the outcomes.  
II. Pre and Post-Arab Spring American Foreign Policy  
Since 2011, the Arab uprisings represent an important turning point in the 
struggle for democracy in the Arab World. The Arab World faced revolutionary 
movements in the 1950’s that led to authoritarian governments. Throughout the Middle 
East military officers held power for decades, including Gamal Abd-al Nasser in Egypt 
and Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya. During this time, governments throughout the Middle 
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East changed the political landscape from an artificial parliamentary system to one 
controlled by a single party. The governments in the 1950’s moved to nationalize the 
economy and attempted to weaken or eliminate socio-economic centers of power in order 
to facilitate the combination of resources necessary to form an authoritarian state 
(Ibrahim, 2016). Once these leaders took power the military governments managed to 
meet peoples’ social and economic needs, however, they managed not to accommodate 
any form of dissent that questioned their power. To distract the public from dissension, 
these governments used patriotism, nationalism, and militarism (Ibrahim, 2016). They 
either eliminated or directly influenced institutions of the state and society that did not 
comply with their policies. In Egypt, massive military spending, commitment to pan-
Arabism, social welfare programs, and Soviet aid were key pillars to the regimes’ 
survival (Ibrahim, 2016). The social programs that kept the general public satisfied began 
to erode by the 1970s once capitalism began to be introduced to the economy. Capitalism 
also led to government employees selling state assets and gaining additional power 
through corruption (Ibrahim, 2016).  
In the Post-Iraq War Middle East, there was a trend of ‘deliberalization’. 
Deliberalization happens when a regime struggles to contain mass public disapproval of 
the war, jihadist movements supporting Iraqi Sunnis, and an increase of threats for 
sectarian violence (Fawcett, 2013). Due to the increased popularity of Islamic 
movements, authoritarian governments, particularly both of my cases, consolidated 
power. After the immediate reaction to consolidate power, a medium term consequence 
was the steady resentment towards incumbent regimes (Fawcett, 2013).   
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 Since World War II, U.S foreign policy in the Middle East had three goals: 
containing Soviet influence, securing oil, and defending Israel. During the Cold War era, 
the pursuit of stability was a priority over democracy for the United States government 
(Ibrahim, 2016).  Another term for American foreign policy in the Middle East during the 
twentieth century is the “holy trinity” (Hudson, 1996). After September 11
th
, the Bush 
administration adopted three policies to protect American interests: defeating terrorism, 
promoting democracy, and destroying weapons of mass destruction (Ibrahim, 2016). 
President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy goals were political and economic 
freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity (President 
Bush, 2002). The strategy states America must stand firm for the demands of human 
dignity, rule of law, limits of absolute power of the state, and other rights that can be 
found in the United States’ Bill of Rights (President Bush, 2002). The United States will 
use foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, 
ensuring the nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take 
(President Bush, 2002). Although the Bush administration publicized these aspirations, 
they fell flat in practice. Throughout his presidency, both Egypt and Libya continued to 
violate and suppress human rights. For regional conflicts, the United States should invest 
time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help 
manage local crises when they emerge. Also, the United States should be realistic about 
its ability to help those who are unwilling or unready to help themselves (President Bush, 
2002).  
Containing Soviet influence strengthened Middle Eastern anti-American 
sentiment that was felt during the timeline of this study. Because the Soviet Union no 
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longer exists, I assess stability has taken precedence in American foreign policy followed 
by the promotion of democracy. President Obama was determined not to follow in 
President Bush’s footsteps in the Middle East. President Obama wanted to improve the 
image of the United States in the Muslim world, trying to mend the United States’ poor 
hypocritical reputation with democracy promotion. Additional resentment was created as 
a result from toppling stable secular governments, such as Iraq, creating a power vacuum 
resulting in a larger regional problem. The Arab Spring took the Obama administration 
by surprise and they did not seem to make any drastic policy changes in response 
(Ibrahim, 2016). Instead of a “one size fits all” approach to the Arab Spring, the Obama 
administration chose to respond on a case-by-case basis. On May 19, 2011 President 
Obama gave a speech at the State Department stating the “wave of change sweeping the 
region could not be denied”, and “failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary 
people will only feed the suspicion” (Ibrahim, 2016). President Obama then later clarified 
that U.S policy aims “promote reform in the region and to support peaceful transitions to 
democracy”.  
Democracy is the ability of citizens to influence the state and the political 
institutions that govern them. Stable democracies need to protect basic rights and liberties 
of minority groups. Without these protections, illiberal democracies can develop where a 
majority consistently discriminates and ignores minorities (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014). By 
this definition, neither case study has ever had a stable democracy. Since the fall of 
Qaddafi, Libya is split into two major governments, a secular government located in 
Tobruk, and an Islamist government located in Tripoli. Since the removal of Mubarak, 
Egypt went from autocratic rule, military rule, democratic rule, then back to military rule, 
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which eventually shaped into a quasi-democratic state. Minority rights under Mubarak 
were non-existent. Morsi promised to include minorities, mainly Bedouins, more into 
Egyptian society, however his promises never came to fruition. President al-Sisi 
continued to deploy similar tactics Mubarak’s regime used, including limiting freedom of 
speech and minority political participation.  
In 2009, democracy-related support and programs for Egypt were downgraded 
from $50 to $20 million and support for Egyptian civil society was cut from $32 to $7 
million. Near the end of the Mubarak era, the Obama administration did not pressure 
Egypt, nor forcefully engage in diplomatic efforts to promote democracy in Egypt 
(Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014). The Obama administration initially responded to the Arab 
Spring with support for democracy, stating democracy “is not a secondary interest. It is a 
top priority that must be translated into concrete actions and supported by all the 
diplomatic, economic, and strategic tools at our disposal” (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014).  
Between 2010 and 2012, funding for civil society decreased 70% from $20.4 
million in 2010 to $6.2 million in 2012, eventually dropping to $3.4 million in 2014 
(Rieffer-Flanagan, 2014).  In the summer of 2013, National Security Adviser, Susan Rice 
reviewed American foreign policy towards Egypt. The United States shifted focus from 
promoting democracy to other areas, notably the situation in Syria, promoting peace 
between Israelis and Palestinians, and trying to finalize a nuclear deal with Iran (Rieffer-
Flanagan, 2014). Even though Rice denied Egypt was no longer a priority, lack of 
resources towards Egypt show Egypt was not a priority. The new Egyptian constitution 
approved in January 2014 did not contribute to a democratic political transition (Rieffer-
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Flanagan, 2014). In the referendum, there was no room for opponents of the referendum 
nor critics of al-Sisi and the interim government. 
 President Hosni Mubarak was one of America’s most reliable allies in the Middle 
East for over a quarter century. As uprisings spread throughout Egypt, President Mubarak 
continued to resist protests wanting to complete his presidential term which was set to 
expire in September 2011. After two hesitant weeks, the United States chose to side with 
the protestors (Ibrahim, 2016).  The United States was in an awkward position during this 
time because while they supported protestors’ right to peaceful protest and assembly, 
Mubarak was discouraged from resigning. Instead, Mubarak was advised not to run for 
re-election (Ibrahim, 2016).  As a result of this indecisiveness, mixed signals were sent 
throughout the Arab world. On one hand the United States supports human rights and 
democracy as a matter of principle, while encouraging autocratic allies to peacefully end 
protestors’ attempt for democracy and regime change. Egypt was considered an asset by 
mediating the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, containing Iran’s influence and 
nuclear goals and aiding in the war on terrorism (Ibrahim, 2016). Once Mohammed 
Morsi was elected, the Obama Administration endorsed the election results and vowed to 
work with the newly elected president. President Morsi’s ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood caused doubts on his ability to lead a government for all Egyptians (Ibrahim, 
2016). Morsi was accused of mishandling the economy and failing to address the same 
problems that caused the initial uprising. On July 3, 2013, Morsi was removed from 
power by military leadership. The Obama administration proceeded the same way as they 
did with Morsi, with caution (Ibrahim, 2016). As violence broke out between pro and 
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anti-Morsi supporters, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, Elizabeth 
Jones issued this statement: 
“Mr. Morsi proved unwilling or unable to govern inclusively, alienating many 
Egyptians. Responding to the desires of millions of Egyptians who believed the 
revolution had taken a wrong turn and you saw a return to security and 
stability…we welcome the interim government’s commitment to a political 
roadmap to restore a democratically elected civilian government. We continue to 
urge the government to be inclusive, respect the rights of all Egyptians, and 
respect the rule of law, freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the role of 
civil society and religious freedom” (Ibrahim, 2016).  
 
In summary, hesitation does not make for effective foreign policy and this chapter will 
continue to show the damage it has created to both case studies.  
IIa.  Libya  
The revolts in Tunisia and Egypt encouraged antigovernment demonstrations led by 
rebel forces in Benghazi mid-February 2011 (Ibrahim, 2016). Much like the Egyptian 
political crisis, the Obama administration did not have a clear plan for Libya. The 
administration first voiced their concerns regarding violence towards peaceful 
demonstrators. The following statement was issued:  
“The United States strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people. 
That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the 
Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are 
not negotiable. They must be respected in every country. And they cannot be 
denied through violence or suppression” (Obama, 2011b) 
 As Qaddafi’s military assaults on civilians continued into a potential humanitarian 
crisis, the Obama administration decided to join a coalition led by NATO to stop the 
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violence (Ibrahim, 2016). President Obama enacted a no-fly zone in Libya in order to 
protect the Libyan people.   
 Even though the administration had support both home and abroad for their 
efforts in the multilateral approach in dealing with Qaddafi, the Obama administration 
failed in providing a safe transition to a democratic Libyan state (Ibrahim, 2016). The 
incident that captured the essence of failure within Libya was the September 2012 attacks 
in Benghazi ultimately killing U.S Ambassador Christopher Stevenson and three other 
Americans (Ibrahim, 2016).  
IIb. Stability of Egypt 
Since the 2011 Egyptian revolution, change has been slow. In March 2015, an 
Egyptian court ruled parliamentary elections be postponed marking a setback for Egypt’s 
plan for democracy (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). Egypt is sending signals to the 
United States saying they are willing to move away from closer ties with them and 
creating a closer relationship with Russia. These signals are a result Russia agreeing to 
build a nuclear power plant in Egypt, increased trade over the past year, and Putin 
vowing to increase weapons sales to Egypt. Due to Egypt’s new, broad anti-terrorism 
laws that brand majority of protestors terrorists, up to 43 non-governmental workers, 
many who are American, were convicted and as of 2015 were still being held in Egypt 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). Chairman Ros-Lehtinen calls for President Sisi to 
pardon these individuals in order to move forward in democratic reforms and improving 
the U.S-Egypt bilateral relationship. Morsi was removed from power because his 
administration forced a constitution to pass with “exceptional” executive authority 
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(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). Once Sisi was elected, his government understood 
the need for economic investment in Egypt and strengthening ties with regional allies. 
Egypt believes the international community has to play an active role in stabilizing Libya.  
As the economy started to worsen under Morsi and popular opinion shifted from 
favorable to unfavorable and Egypt’s state institutions started to turn against him. Rather 
than trying to compromise, the Muslim Brotherhood mobilized their supporters and 
would use violence to defend Morsi (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). Once the 
military took power from the Muslim Brotherhood, the generals thought they either had 
to destroy the Brotherhood, or risk them remobilizing and seeking revenge. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has made calls for jihad and fighting the Sisi regime. Withholding military 
aid to Egypt in response to crackdowns against protestors did not change Egypt’s 
authoritarianism (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2015). At this time, political participation 
does not exist in Egypt. The way al-Sisi is currently ruling Egypt is a reliable indicator on 
how stable Egypt is overall. Al-Sisi’s regime is mimicking some of Mubarak’s methods 
by using force and jailing journalists and activists. Although Egypt is not as unstable as 
Libya, expectations towards democracy in Egypt have not been met so far (Foreign 
Affairs Committee, 2015).  
On Wednesday June 25, 2014, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 
Africa met to discuss Libya. Chairman Ileanan Ros-Lehtinen gave an introduction 
outlining several key points regarding the current situation within Libya. The Arab 
Spring brought forth a period of hope for the future and prospect of democracy in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The lack of infrastructure, lack of democratic institutions 
and the lack of political will make the chances of democracy flourishing in Libya slim to 
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non-existent (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). The problem with Libya is there are 
multiple crises occurring at the same time and they are all linked together. Libya is not 
capable of securing their borders which means it cannot repel the influx of foreign 
fighters streaming across their porous borders.  Because Libya’s government cannot 
secure their borders, it cannot take advantage of oil revenues and reserves which leads to 
the inability to stimulate the economy. Political factions remain divided thus stalling the 
state building process. A stalled state building process means the inability to make critical 
economic and security reforms (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). Congresswoman Ros-
Lehtinen advocates the United States have a hands-on approach and find a way to work 
with the various political parties in order to resolve issues so Libyans can form a 
government that can de-escalate tensions and fighting and finally get Libya on pace to 
transitioning to democracy (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014).  
Libya is a result of a failed policy. The Obama administration played an active 
role in overthrowing Qaddafi, however once the conflict was over, the United States let 
their allies, being the EU and other NATO members take an active role in the transition 
process. Ros-Lehtinen describes the situation in Libya as an “uphill battle” that the 
administration cannot afford to take lightly in fear of Libya turning into Iraq and another 
strategic defeat in the Middle East (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014).  After the conflict, 
the U.N was in charge of border security. The EU did not assist until 2013 when they sent 
some border security assistance teams and only sent a portion of what was initially agreed 
upon (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). From 2013-2016, the U.N has made several 
attempts to bring the opposing governments to peace talks and reach an agreement with 
no success. The 2015, the U.N held peace talks in Skhirat, Morocco meant to establish a 
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single governing body that was supposed to ensure “broad representation”. Talks broke 
down as critics of the plan believed the new government did not accurately represent all 
of Libya’s tribes and factions (Al-Jazeera, 2016). In January 2016, the U.N’s backed 
government located in Tobruk voted to reject a new unity plan to unite the rival 
government (Al-Jazeera, 2016).  
I assess Libyan political stability cannot be achieved by American unilateral 
intervention. The problem in Libya will have to require a committed multilateral solution 
comprised of the United Nations and European Union. Safety of American personnel 
must always remain a priority as well (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). Ambassador 
Anne Patterson, Assistant Secretary to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs issued the 
following statement: 
“Libya’s transition faces significant challenges that will require intensive 
engagement by the U.S and our international partners for many years. Since the 
fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libyans have been struggling to build a stable and 
effective democratic government that provides a secure environment and 
economic opportunity. The stakes for the United States, as well as for the Libyan 
people, are substantial. U.S national security interests require vigorous U.S. 
engagement to support Libya. We are pursuing several important initiatives to try 
and arrest further political and security instability and help revive Libya’s private 
sector so it can play a crucial role in stabilizing the country and we would like to 
do more. First, in the immediate term, we are urging Libyans to agree to general 
principles to build consensus and guide the remainder of the political transition 
and stressing that political differences must be settled through dialogue and 
compromise. Second, we are working with Libya, its neighbors, and the 
international community to strengthen Libya’s internal security and tightening 
border security. Finally, once there is sufficient political stability and security, we 
have created a framework that partner countries will use to coordinate their 
assistance in key areas. We are also encouraging the U.S private sector to come in 
and help rebuild Libya’s economy and its institutions” (Foreign Affairs 




The previous statement made by Ambassador Patterson shows the Obama 
administration recognized the severity of the problems in Libya. The United States still 
wanted Libyans to make political decisions regarding the transition process and who 
would take over the final legitimate governing body, relying on dialogue and compromise 
to solve the political crisis. The statement made by Ambassador Patterson makes it seem 
solving the political security is the number one priority, followed by solving the security 
problem, and lastly solving the economic.  
The first key factor for a successful transition from lawlessness to a stable 
democracy is the development of Libyan armed forces. In 2013, the United States 
committed to help train a force of 5,000-8,000 personnel. These personnel will help form 
the core of the Libyan military. This will cost approximately $600 million over eight 
years and will be led by United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2014). Despite 2014 being a year of instability and violence in Libya, 
Assistant Secretary Patterson believes Libya is taking positive steps in their economy and 
democratic transition (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). One of the United States’ goals 
is to train Libyans in the basics of public administration and finance. The United States 
also focused efforts with European allies on promoting democratic processes crucial for 
long-term stability (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). Derek Chollet, an executive vice 
president and senior advisor for security and defense policy at The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States, outlines four issues on creating political stability: general 
purpose force, counterterrorism training, border security, and efforts to secure U.S 
Embassy in Tripoli (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014).  
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Chollet stressed in the hearing that this is an international effort and not a 
unilateral move by the United States. United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey have all begun 
training Libyan personnel as of 2014. However, as stated earlier, what has made progress 
in Libya crawl at a slow pace since 2011, are the multiple crises occurring at once all 
affecting each other at the same time (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). In addition to 
educating military personnel, the next goal is to develop a counterterrorism program 
funded by the Global Security Contingency Fund. Chollet also advised Libya is using the 
Global Security Contingency Fund for border security. The United States understands 
security risks are high while operating an embassy in an environment as volatile as 
Tripoli. In response to this,  the United States has placed several military forces in the 
region to be on standby in case they are needed to respond to an emergency to avoid 
another situation that would mirror that September 2012 Benghazi attacks (Foreign 











Libya Freedom House Rankings 2011-2016 
Year Status Freedom Rating Civil Liberties Political Rights 
2011 Not Free 6.5 6 7 
2012 Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
2013 Partly Free 4.5 5 4 
2014 Not Free 6 6 6 
2015 Not Free 6 6 6 
2016 Not Free 6.5 6 7 
In the above table, the freedom rating, civil liberties, and political rights are 
ranked from a scale of 1-7. 1 is the best and 7 is the worst. For the status portion, 
freedom house ranks countries as either “free”, “partly free”, and “not free”.  
III. Egypt 
Ambassador Patterson advised the Egyptians are concerned with their border 
along Libya. The Egyptian/Libyan border is essentially 700 miles of desert. Egypt has 
increased their presence along the border through an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
base (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014). The UAV’s are Chinese made by supported by 
the United Arab Emirates. Overall, the relation between Libya and Egypt can be 
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considered professional and cordial, but Egypt is worried about the fighting in eastern 
Libya spilling into Egypt. Egypt also has a large number of quest workers in Libya. 
Ambassador Patterson was also asked if allowing others to lead sets a precedent for not 
holding others accountable to their commitments. At a glance, allowing others to lead 
does set a precedent for not holding others accountable to their commitments; however 
the problem in Libya is a difficult one. The Obama administration was in between acting 
multilaterally and unilaterally in Libya. Hesitation by the administration has not 
expedited the process of a successful transitional government.   
IV. Political Transition in Egypt and Libya 
In the modernization theory, the challenge authoritarian regimes face is that once 
societies reach a certain level of social mobilization (education, literacy, urbanization, 
and size of the middle class) that regimes do not accommodate demands for political 
participation risk they will take revolutionary forms unless otherwise contained by 
exceptional means such as totalitarianism. North Africa states were considered middle 
range for modernization where democratization pressures were significant but could still 
be contained (Hinnebusch, 2015).  
Dr. Eva Bellin argues regimes’ resilience is effective based on reliability of the 
effectiveness of security forces along with militaries’ responses to uprisings (Hinnebusch, 
2015). Egypt’s military retained institutional autonomy of top political leadership but also 
had conflicts of interest with the presidential family. Egypt’s military also had a stake in 
the economy. Libya’s military was not institutionalized and this caused a split due to 
tribal and family ties (Hinnebusch, 2015).  
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When Mubarak took over Egypt from President Anwar Al Sadat, he inherited a 
false multiparty system and an Islamist movement created to quell secular opposition. 
Mubarak continued to systematically limit liberals and the left. Mubarak prevented 
political parties being established and prevented them from reaching an audience within 
Egypt (Awad, 2013). Despite Mubarak’s efforts to limit Islamist’s power, the 
combination of economic liberty and private enterprise allowed the Muslim Brotherhood 
to build a solid economic base. When the Muslim Brotherhood was close to obtaining 
any kind of power, Mubarak’s regime turned to repression, jailing, and torturing 
members (Awad, 2013). Mubarak’s regime endorsed Salafists to balance out the Muslim 
Brotherhood because of their involvement in charity; they did not have a centralized 
movement, and their lack of involvement towards politics. After the military took over 
and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over, stability was priority in 
the new political system. SCAF wanted to introduce little to no changes when it came to 
their role and privileges.  
Secular middle class youth who are internet proficient played an important role in 
starting anti-regime movements. Educated but unemployed members of society who saw 
themselves as victims of discriminatory “crony” capitalism looked to democracy as the 
answer to their problem (Hinnebush, 2015). The absence of ideology and organization 
meant they could not build a counter government capable of replacing incumbent 
regimes, nor mobilizing mass votes. Secular liberals in Egypt could not compete with 
Islamists in elects that compromised democracy to revive the ability of the “deep state”, 
meaning the military or the monarch to use them against the Islamists. Critics of Islamist 
groups argue democratic elections have potential to bring anti-democratic Islamists to 
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power, which in turn would end democracy. Others argue that including Islamists in the 
political process would incentivize them to moderate ideology in order to gain coalitions 
with secular opposition opponents (Hinnebusch, 2015). Islamists had an advantage over 
liberals and secularists because they had electoral experience, charities, schools and 
television stations, welfare services, funding from Gulf States, and the use of mosques 
and madrassas for recruitment. Liberals and secularists spent time and energy towards 
street protests while Islamists spent their efforts towards winning elections (Hinnebusch, 
2015). All parties in Egypt want limits on majorities built into the constitution: secularists 
want the military to introduce guarantees against Islamist majorities while the Muslim 
Brotherhood wants legislation examined by a religious body like Iran’s Council of 
Guardians (Hinnebusch, 2015). According to Hinnebusch, the middle class values 
personal liberty more than democracy. According to Islamists, democracy is valuable but 
serves a subordinate role to religious law (Hinnebusch, 2015).  
Dr. Adham Saouli from St. Andrew’s University states that major unintended 
consequences of the Arab uprisings have been state failure (Hinnebusch, 2015). 
Vulnerability of the state traced back to identity-fragmented Arab states to the limited 
inclusion of groups by regimes assembled around sectarian cores with artificial borders 
exposing them to the “destabilizing effect of trans-state interference” (Hinnebusch, 
2015). Libya suffered state failure from the military’s incapacity to defend territorial 
integrity either because they were kept intentionally weak or decimated by foreign 
intervention. As order broke down in both Libya and Egypt, people turned to their tribes 
for security. During a war economy, rival groups look to gain access to capital through 
smuggling, looting, arms trade, and exploitation of natural resources (Hinnebusch, 2015). 
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Those not participating in these illegal acts either gravitate towards warlords and militias 
for survival or flee the country as refugees. Regarding Egypt and Libya, it is the latter. 
Refugees fleeing the Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria travel through Egypt into 
Libya where eventually they cross the Mediterranean into southern Europe.    
Another pathway for democratic transition is polyarchy. Democratization 
literature identifies several conditions. First, being the existence of a shared political 
community allowing peaceful electoral transition has been challenging in the Middle East 
and North Africa due to tribal lines running deeper than an allegiance towards the state 
(Hinnebusch, 2015). Democratic consolidation depends on a balance of class power and a 
“democratic coalition” and their ability to extract the democratization process from the 
state. In Egypt, an anti-regime coalition used the internet to mobilize a large force against 
the ruler to a point where the military, who prioritized their own interests over the state, 
enabled an outside coalition to engineer a presidential departure (2015). A split between 
Islamists and secularists along with an over-sized politicized military allowed a 
significant “restoration” of the old regime, which Hinnebusch defines as the outcome of a 
state that survives an uprising where the elite class uses information and wealth to their 
advantage to command levers of bureaucracies and cohesion to combat a divided public 
(Hinnebusch, 2015).  
As of 2017, the Arab Spring removed four presidents and made a mobilized 
public a factor in regional states. Initially, the main problem during the transition period 
was to incorporate the masses into democratization and ultimately democratic 
consolidation (Hinnebusch, 2015). I do not believe U.S aid would help strengthen the 
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democratization process in either country. As the data shows, majority of U.S foreign aid 
to both countries is in the security sector.  
During the Arab Spring, Egyptians were angry about how Egypt was ruled, the 
aggressive security measures, corruption, and the deteriorating economic and social 
situation. There were several changes that emerged from the transition post-Arab spring. 
Egyptian youth led protests while the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the most 
organized political group. The military, the protagonist of transition, wanted little change 
as possible (2013).  
IVa. Seculars vs. Islamists in Egypt and Libya 
Secularists and Islamists have different ideas for government and that is why there 
has been a theme of political violence in both cases. No amount of foreign aid will 
resolve this issue for either Libya or Egypt. In Egypt, Secularists want a civilian head of 
state and democratic state. The Muslim Brotherhood requests a civilian head of state, 
along with “an Islamic reference”. In the end, SCAF sided with the Muslim Brotherhood 
because the left was disorganized and their ideas and vision for the country seemed 
unfavorable in the eyes of the military (Awad, 2013). SCAF thought by backing the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the country would run smoothly, however the military never had 
any agreements with opposition, whether it was Islamist or secularist.  
Protests did not stop once the military gained power. Demonstrations were met 
with more repression and violence. Protestors were prosecuted through military courts. 
To counter protests, strikes and sit-ins, the military adopted a law prohibiting actions that 
“hurt the population’s interest” (Awad, 2013). This was not effective in preventing 
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further protests and this resulted with several hundred deaths from late 2011 to mid-2012. 
Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi abolished the SCAF’s constitutional declaration 
after being in power for only five weeks. Morsi changed the composition of the SCAF by 
dismissing senior leadership like the chairman and deputy chairman and appointing a new 
minister of defense (2013). From February 13 to May 30 2011, SCAF suspended Egypt’s 
1971 constitution. SCAF though about amending the constitution but it never happened. 
IVb. U.S Efforts Assessed 
From 2011 to the end of the Obama administration, the United States played a 
delicate role in the political transition in Egypt. The United States went from initially 
supporting protestors and called for Mubarak to step down, to a democratically elected 
Muslim Brotherhood government, to military rule. The United States faced a dilemma of 
supporting a secular government that overthrew a democratically elected one. The 1974 
Trade Act specifies considering human rights while financially dealing with other 
countries falls under the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor Affairs (Shannon & Cummins, 2014). Section 7008 of Public Law 112-74, the 
most recent foreign operations appropriations act, states “none of the funds appropriated 
shall be obligated or expended to the government of any country whose duly elected head 
of government is deposed by military coup d’état in which the military plays a decisive 
role” (Shannon & Cummins, 2014). On July 26, 2013, U.S State Department 
spokesperson Jen Psaki stated the “law does not require us to make a formal 
determination as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to 
make such a determination” (Shannon & Cummins, 2014). The Obama administration 
made several calls to Egypt to return to a democratically elected government. Once that 
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did not work, the United States suspended the delivery of four F-16s in July, then did not 
participate in joint military exercises with Egypt following bloody crackdowns on 
protestors (Shannon & Cummins, 2014). These tactics only opened up an opportunity for 
Russia to pledge a $2 billion arms deal.  
Table 4.2  
Egypt Freedom House Rankings from 2011-2016 
Year Status Freedom Rating Civil Liberties Political Rights  
2011 Not Free 5.5 5 6 
2012 Partly Free 5.0 5 5 
2013 Not Free 5.5 5 6 
2014 Not Free 5.5 5 6 
2015 Not Free 5.5 5 6 
2016 Not Free 5.5 5 6 
 
As previously mentioned in table 4.1, Egypt’s Freedom House rankings and 
scales are the same as Libya’s. Countries are considered “free”, “partly free”, or “not 
free”. For the other categories, 1 equals the best ranking, while 7 equals the worst.  
I would consider Egypt to be authoritarian in nature and neither democratic, nor 
showing any signs of heading towards becoming a democracy. This is due to new anti-
terrorism laws being passed and cracking down on opposition groups, particularly 
Islamist groups. While Egypt is experiencing an on-going terrorism battle, mainly in the 
Sinai Peninsula, I assess Egypt is fairly stable compared to Libya. Libya can be 
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considered a failing state, due to several governing bodies claiming to be the respective 
legitimate governments and multiple armed groups with various affiliations fighting for 
control.  
Table 4.3 
Fragile States Index Rankings for Egypt and Libya 2011-2016 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Egypt 45 31 34 31 38 38 
Libya 111 50 54 41 25 25 
 
Data for Table 4.3 was provided by fundforpeace.org Fragile State Index. The 
rankings in the previous table are out of 178. The lower the number, the more unstable 
the country is. While the United States wants to spread the growth and sustainability of 
democracy around the world, there are moments where stability is preferred to 
democratization.  
V. Conclusion 
 Although the United States gave varying amounts of aid to Egypt and Libya, one 
variable remains the same. I assess the United States’ approach or lack of approach, to 
Libya and Egypt caused greater political instability, thus leading to overall greater 
instability. The Obama administration approached the Arab Spring on a case by case 
basis and hesitated during both of Egypt’s revolts when both Mubarak and Morsi were 
removed from power. US aid to Egypt did not fluctuate very much from 2011-2016. At 
this moment, Egypt is at a crossroads for their democracy to succeed.  Secularists within 
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Egypt are willing to give up democracy altogether if it means Islamists are not included 
within government. Both secularists and Islamists are against a military figure as a head 
of state. Both groups favor a civilian as a head of state. Libya has an internal battle 
between Secularists and Islamists on a grand scale because both factions have their own 
government they believe is legitimate. Along with two major opposition governments, 
Libya has many armed tribes and militias.  
The Obama administration played an active role in assisting rebels overthrow 
Qaddafi; however the transition process was left up to the EU and other NATO allies. 
Although I believe more aid to Libya could have made a difference in strengthening all 
aspects of the country, how the situation was handled has created steep setbacks that will 
take many years of intensive planning and training. The United States did not want 
another outcome like the Iraq War; however, due to lack of involvement post-revolution, 
it appears that more American and European involvement in Libya seems unavoidable. 
While examining all the research and data regarding Libya, I would advise it is necessary 
for not only the United States, but the International Community to become more involved 
in Libya. I do not think U.N held peace talks between both rival governments will create 
a solution to the steady problem that Libya has become. Future presidential 
administrations in the United States will have to examine Libya in a closer glance.  
From 2011-2016, United States foreign aid used for democracy and the promotion 
of democracy to Egypt has steadily decreased. Historically, foreign aid to Egypt has been 
heavily military aid. Egypt has been receiving aid totally approximately $1.2 to $1.3 
billion, with at least $1 billion going towards military aid. As previously stated, the 
Obama administration initially sided with protestors and favored the growth of 
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democracy within Egypt, however, in a two to three year span other events started 
occurring that shifted resources, being the Syrian conflict, Iran nuclear deal, and the on -
going Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Obama administration shifted resources from 
supporting democracy to supporting the Egyptian economy. Despite the lack of financial 
resources to promoting democracy in Egypt, the state is functional and provides more 
services to its population compared to Libya. In both cases, the promotion of democracy 

















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 In 2011, a historic political shift swept across the Middle East and Northern 
Africa. Autocratic rulers who spent decades in power by using corruption and their loyal 
security apparatuses to oppress any political or social opposition were removed from 
power. Social media became an important tool in increasing revolutionary participation 
and documenting the revolution itself. Social media played a prominent role in the 
Egyptian revolution. Can democracy finally be established and sustained in the Middle 
East?  
 Throughout this thesis, I have examined the security, economic, and political 
situation in Libya and Egypt from 2011-2016. I have found that American foreign aid to 
Libya and Egypt has not led to increased stability in my dependent variables for both 
cases. While Egypt is not a weak state like Libya, there has been little to no progress 
made in the security, political, and economic sectors. While Egypt receives over a billion 
dollars of military aid a year, the Sinai Peninsula continues to be a constant source of 
conflict. Police and the military continue to be targets of violence resulting in al-Sisi 
cracking down on Egyptians with raids, interrogations, torture, and arrests without due 
process. In return, Egyptians in the Sinai will continue to feel alienated and will gravitate 
towards terror groups, such as Egypt’s franchise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. As previously stated in the first chapter, Egyptian 
policing can be described as extreme on both ends of the spectrum. Although the Sinai is 
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dangerous for police, either cracking down too hard, or not policing the area at all is not 
an effective way in stabilizing the peninsula. Islamic militants in both countries are well 
armed and possess automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenades, shoulder-fired surface to 
air missiles and various types of anti-aircraft guns fixated on the backs of pickup trucks.  
 After the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, all aspects of government 
ceased to exist. American foreign aid has not been an effective tool in helping stabilize 
the continuous security situation in Libya. The amount of money stemming from illegal 
activities, such as weapons trades and transporting migrants to Europe across the 
Mediterranean Sea outweighs the amount of money the United States gives to Libya by a 
large margin. Groups like Ansar al-Sharia (ASL) fill voids in Libyans’ lives that were 
created post revolution, such as providing education, security, and other charity. While 
ASL is not as violent as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt, ASL recruits foreign fighters 
who want to fight in Syria by placing them in training camps in Libya. ASL is still 
capable of committing violence and terrorism throughout Libya, but violence is not their 
primary method.  
The dual threat of ASL and the Islamic State in Libya will have to be properly 
addressed before any progress can be made. Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIL’s franchise in 
Libya is their most sophisticated franchise and has the potential to become the next main 
battleground when the Syrian conflict comes to an end. In the ending months of 2016, the 
Islamic State was pushed out of Sirte but still poses a threat towards Libya and its 
neighbors. Libya’s borders with all of its neighbors are porous and not patrolled 
regularly; however, some neighbors are taking measures to strengthen security. In 2015, 
Tunisia began building a wall and water trenches, while Algeria is building a fence (Abi-
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Habib & Morajea, 2016). Neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Niger have been 
warned to stay on alert in order to attempt to block foreign fighters looking to return to 
their home countries (Abi-Habib & Morajea, 2016). U.S airstrikes played an important 
role in retaking Sirte. Sirte was the only city in Libya under the Islamic State’s control. 
Sirte provided a strategic value because it has access to the water. While losing Sirte was 
a significant defeat for the Islamic State, there is plenty of countryside to hide, mainly in 
the southern and eastern parts of the country. Once Libya unites politically, the daunting 
task of securing their borders and having full sovereignty will become plausible.  
In the past several years, the North Africa and Middle East region (MENA) is in a 
semi economic quagmire. Lack of opportunity in the region has caused migrants to take 
refuge in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Europe. The only industry in the region 
that received significant foreign investment during the time line of my study was the 
hydrocarbon industry.  
Libya’s economic problems are intertwined with their own security problems. Oil 
fields are soft targets and this makes them vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  The Libyan 
economy is mismanaged and corrupt. Libya’s economy is one dimensional and will not 
grow because oil fields are under constant threat. The security threat plays a direct role in 
shutting down oil production, which leads to hydrocarbon employees not getting paid, 
which then will lead to strikes and a further economic downfall. A two pronged approach 
must be in place in order for the Libyan economy to improve. There are multiple crises 
happening at the same time in Libya, therefore, Libyan oil fields must be secure from any 
radicalized groups wishing to take advantage of an easy target. Libya has the resources to 
have a growing economy, however mismanagement of resource revenues prevent this 
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from happening. At the moment, Libya also does not have a clear plan for their economy. 
Libya’s budget lacks direction. With the trend of economic aid shown in this study, I 
assess Libya’s economy will not improve in the immediate future. In order for the Libyan 
economy to improve, it will take committed multilateral involvement. The process to 
improve the Libyan economy will be messy and time consuming. Lots of resources, like 
capital and training personnel will have to be spent.  
From 2011 to 2016, the United States was more involved and invested in the 
Egyptian economy than the Libyan economy. In late 2011, Egypt was included in a 
congressional enterprise fund whose purpose was to develop Egypt’s private sector, 
particularly investing in small to medium sized business (Badreldin, 2015). Egypt is more 
a strategic asset than Libya is. This statement is true because the United States overrode 
laws regarding foreign aid with Egypt. Although President Morsi, a democratically 
elected president was removed by the Egyptian military, Secretary of State John Kerry 
authorized aid to Egypt because Egypt is important to the national security of the United 
States (Badreldin, 2015). This action shows the United States values stability in Egypt 
more than the value of democracy. As long as Egypt is continuing a strategic relationship 
with the United States and is in accordance to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the United 
States will continue to supply Egypt with both military and economic aid (Badreldin, 
2015). 
 Like Libya, the political and security climate scares off foreign investment, 
forcing Egypt to take loans from Persian Gulf monarchies in order to compensate for 
Egypt’s import/export deficit (CIA, 2017). The loans are for short-medium term 
investments from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait for $18 billion 
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(Badreldin, 2015). Although Egypt’s economy is surviving right now with foreign loans, 
the resiliency of the Egyptian economy will be scrutinized once money from the Gulf 
States stops flowing into Egypt (Badreldin, 2015). The next question would be can Egypt 
survive on their own with little to no foreign aid? Can Egypt eventually close the 
import/export gap? 
The Egyptian economy is in a quagmire and can be described as struggling. 
Although Egypt is experiencing continuous economic problems, their economy is still 
stronger than Libya’s. Egypt has the means to strengthen their economy and does not 
have to start from the ground and work their way up. Although Egypt’s unemployment 
has plateaued at approximately 12.6 percent, Egypt has a steady supply of job seekers; 
however, local businesses are unable to keep up with the demand. USAID in Egypt wants 
to decrease the time it takes to register businesses, secure licenses and tax requirements 
(2016). If USAID is successful in eliminating Egyptian bureaucratic “red tape”, 
unemployment in Egypt will decrease, more businesses will grow, and foreign 
investments will increase, eventually leading to a stronger Egyptian economy.  
In Chapter three, I discussed political stability in both Egypt and Libya. My study 
shows that political stability has not improved in either country, but has worsened in 
separate ways. Historically, tribal lines and religion played a dominant role in Middle 
Eastern politics. Libya has two different governments believing they are the legitimate 
governing body. Libya’s problems predate their 2011 revolution by several decades. 
Throughout Qaddafi’s rule, Libyan political institutions were purposefully weakened. 
During the transition period, both countries experienced internal disagreements on who 
should be head of state. In Egypt, groups who wish to have a secular head of state are 
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willing to go as far as eliminating any prospects of democracy in order to not have an 
Islamist government. Although there is not an all-out civil war in Egypt, these types of 
disagreements prevent democracy from being established in Egypt.  
For the majority of this study, Egypt has been classified as “not free” according to 
freedomhouse.org. After Mubarak resigned in 2011, Egypt received an upward trend 
arrow. An upward trend arrow can be defined as a certain country is taking the right steps 
in becoming from politically liberated. Along with the overthrow of President Mubarak, 
Egypt received an upward trend arrow because of judicial independence and political 
pluralism (freedomhouse.org, 2017). Although Egypt received an upward trend, Egypt’s 
overall scores were low for civil liberties, political rights, and overall freedom rating. In 
2012, Egypt had their highest ranking. Egypt upgraded from the category “not free” to 
“partly free”. This boost in ratings was due to holding a presidential election that was 
fairly close to international standards and took away power from the military, or the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) (freedomhouse.org, 2017). The new 
political upgrade did not bring an end to instability. Unilateral action from the new 
Islamist majority government was met with resistance and a power struggle between 
judicial and political branches boiled over resulting in Egypt’s lower house of parliament 
being dissolved (freedomhouse.org, 2017). In an attempt to gain control of a chaotic 
political situation, President Morsi gave himself additional executive powers. After 
giving himself additional power, a new constitution was written but was criticized as it 
was written by an majority Islamist assembly. President Morsi failed trying to politically 
stabilize Egypt, and the hope for a democratic Egypt would seem to never recover.  
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In 2013, Egypt’s classification fell from “partly free” back to “not free” after 
President Morsi was removed. Egypt also received the not free status as a result from 
crackdowns against Islamist political groups and civil society, along with the increased 
role of the military in the political process (freedomhouse.org, 2017). Politically, there 
was lots of activity in Egypt. In the spring activists who named themselves Tamarrod, 
which translates to “Rebellion”, started a petition demanding the withdrawal of 
confidence from the Morsi government and early elections. Millions of demonstrators 
took to the streets on June 30, the anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017). After the protests started, the military gave Morsi two days to 
answer to popular demands, or promises he fell short on delivering. On July 3, Morsi was 
detained by the military, the constitution was suspended, and an interim government was 
installed led by Adli Mansour, chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017). A new constitution was to be written by a panel of legal 
experts and revised by a 50 member committee. This committee was not demographically 
or politically representative, with five women, four Coptic Christians, and one Islamist 
member. Secret votes were occasionally conducted and the final document gave 
additional powers to the military, the judicial branch, and the police (freedomhouse.org, 
2017). Morsi’s supporters demonstrated against the interim government and were met 
with harsh opposition resulting in more than 1,000 deaths. Islamist protestors believed the 
Coptic Christian community was behind Morsi’s overthrow and the status quo treatment 
of the Islamist community (freedomhouse.org, 2017). Egypt went from overthrowing a 
democratically elected government via coup d’état, to establishing a new constitution 
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with no room for dissent, to eventually disbanding the Muslim Brotherhood and declaring 
them a terrorist organization.  
Egypt received a “not free” status by freedom house for the 2014 fiscal year. This 
was mainly due the marginalization of political opposition, state surveillance of 
electronic communications, encouraging the public to report political dissent, and mass 
trials of Muslim Brotherhood members (freedomhouse.org, 2017). Elections were held 
May 26-28 where victor Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won 95 percent of the vote. The government 
targeted journalists reporting on political opposition. During 2014, the insurgency in the 
Sinai Peninsula grew stronger. The government responded with demolishing hundreds of 
homes along the Gaza Strip border trying to stop the flow of weapons and militants 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017). In 2015 and 2016, Egypt did not make any political progress, 
resulting in another “not free” status due to the same government activity that occurred 
the year before.  
I. Freedom House: Libya 
In 2011, as a result of Qaddafi losing control of Libya, Libya improved their 
status from “not free” to “partly free”. Media freedom and access to information 
expanded. The initial constitutional draft had requirements for more freedom of 
expression and the press. The press also had more access to political officials 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017). Journalists were able to cover more news and not have to 
worry about violence or being intimidated. This is a vast improvement compared to the 
Qaddafi regime, where there was no independent press, only state controlled media. In 
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the beginning stages of the protests, state media outlets only showed demonstrators loyal 
to the regime.  
2012 Freedom House results were the same as the previous year. Libya was 
considered “partly free”. The National Transitional Council (NTC), formed shortly after 
armed conflict broke out in February 2011 (freedomhouse.org, 2017). Their goal was to 
influence Libya towards their first democratic elections, which would eventually take 
place in July 2012. In August, the NTC handed power to the new legislative body, the 
General National Council (GNC) (freedomhouse.org, 2017). These political 
achievements were tarnished by the failure to establish security and rule of law. GNC 
was unable to control parts of the country due to semiautonomous militias 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017). While some militias associated themselves with the rebuilding 
national army, others became proxies for the government, or even acted under their own 
supervision. The lack of oversight created an unsafe environment for journalists 
(freedomhouse.org, 2017).  
 For 2013, Libya remained the same at “partly free”. 2013 was a difficult year for 
Libya attempting to contain security challenges and building a constitutional system by 
electing a 60 member assembly called the General National Congress (GNC) 
(freedomhouse, 2017). The GNC continued to pass laws and decrees, however the ability 
to enforce these laws were limited. The lack of ability to enforce laws led to an increase 
in frustration among the citizens mainly with the multiple autonomous militias 
(freedomhouse, 2017). Demonstrations began and were met with violence. Most notable 
acts of violence took place in June in Benghazi, where 32 people were killed after 
civilians protested abuse by a local militia. In November of 2013, 43 people were killed 
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as protestors wanted regional militias to leave the cities of Zintan and Misrata 
(freedomhouse, 2017). Before he was kidnapped, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan vowed to 
investigate, however the militias involved were not prosecuted.  
 2014 was a difficult year for Libya. Overall freedom rating, civil liberties, and 
political rights categories all declined according to freedom house. Libya was 
downgraded from “partly free” to “not free”. Overall, these decreased rankings are a 
result from Libya’s humanitarian crisis, Libya’s descent into civil war, and increasing 
political polarization (freedomhouse, 2017). Libya held elections February 2014 for a 
Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution, along with municipal 
council elections that began in April. The House of Representatives (HoR) was supposed 
to replace the General National Congress as the country’s interim legislative body in June 
(freedomhouse, 2017). Opponents of the House of Representatives revived the General 
National Congress and started the branch in Tripoli, while the House of Representatives 
was in Tobruk.  
 In May 2014, General Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive as the head of a 
coalition called Operation Dignity that pledged to rid Libya of Islamists. This pledge 
included all Islamist groups, including moderate and extremist groups. In response to 
Operation Dignity being formed, Libya Dawn was formed and pledged their support 
towards GNC based in Tripoli (freedomhouse, 2017). The civil war comprises not only of 
a battle between ideologies, but a regional battle between different militias. Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates supplied arms to Operation Dignity, while Qatar 
and Turkey sided with the Islamist coalition, Libya Dawn (freedomhouse, 2017).  
 
 82 
 In 2015, Libya had the same freedom house political status as “not free”. The civil 
war in Libya was at its peak. In the conflict, hundreds of armed rival groups were 
entrenched in a stalemate. The conflict broke down infrastructure and displaced 
approximately 400,000 people since mid-2014 (freedomhouse, 2017). The security 
breakdown and political vacuum allowed the Islamic State to take over Sirte. The United 
Nations began to get involved with attempting to cease the political violence by 
attempting to establish a unified government with negotiations involving members of the 
competing governments, political party representatives, and council members 
(freedomhouse, 2017). In December 2015, representatives from both groups signed a UN 
agreement saying the HoR would be the primary legislature, while GNC members would 
make up most of the State Council, a secondary consultative body (freedomhouse, 2017). 
This agreement would be in place until a new constitution would be adopted and new 
parliamentary elections. The agreement appeared promising, but fell apart once hardliners 
on both sides deemed the agreement unacceptable. Although a legislative agreement was 
created, there was no such agreement security wise to dismantle armed groups. 
According to Freedom house, there was no significant improvement within Libya for the 
2016 fiscal year.  
 As of February 8, 2017, Russia and the European Union support General Haftar in 
having a formal role to unite Libya. The European Union has a vested interest in trying to 
unite Libya in order to solve the migrant crisis. Russia looked to strengthen relations with 
General Haftar mainly to combat the Islamic State and other terror groups (Barigazzi & 
Herszenhorn, 2017).The EU is concerned with Russia’s increased interest and influence 
within Libya because there is the possibility that the Kremlin would obtain some control 
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over the flow of migrants to Europe from Africa. EU foreign policy chief Federica 
Mogherini stated the European Union will not dictate solutions to Libya. These solutions 
must be accomplished by Libyans (Barigazzi & Herszenhorn, 2017).  
II. Analysis of Hypotheses 
 In the introductory chapter, my first hypothesis state that high amounts of aid, 
whether economic or military is not effective when the recipient is either a failed state or 
on their way to becoming a failed state. I assess this hypothesis to be true based on my 
findings with both of my cases. American foreign aid to Egypt has been consistently over 
a billion dollars, hovering around $1.3 billion during the time frame of my case study. 
Approximately one billion dollars is spent towards security, whether that is helping 
maintain the Egyptian armed forces, buy new equipment, or help reform police and 
intelligence services to curb terrorism. Since Mohammad Morsi was removed from 
power, security stability in Egypt has worsened. Islamist groups used Morsi’s removal as 
an attack against Islam as a whole. As of March 2017, clashes between Islamic State 
affiliates and the Egyptian security forces occur almost daily with little sign of slowing 
down. American foreign aid is having no impact on the security dependent variable. 
Foreign aid towards the security sector Egypt is important.  
 My second hypothesis said when there is much more military aid than economic 
aid, results can be unpredictable. Lack of diversification in funds can cause other 
variables to start to fail. The Egyptian and Libyan economies are just as important as the 
political and security sectors. If it was possible to suddenly solve Libya’s and Egypt’s 
economic problems overnight, this would relieve tension and would make things easier to 
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solve problems politically and security wise. American foreign aid has had no impact in 
both case studies and their economies.  
 My last hypothesis said any amount of aid, economic or military is effective when 
the recipient is fairly stable because there are no major issues to warrant mass protest, 
thus causing the ruling government the potential to be overthrown. For this hypothesis, I 
assess there are no results because neither of my case studies were stable enough to begin 
this. The transition process was not easy for both of my cases, resulting in even more 
protests and clashes between military personnel and civilians. Interim governments did 
not rule for long and it can be argued these interim governments never had full 
sovereignty over their respective territories.  
III. Future Assessment for Egypt and Libya 
 I assess with medium to high confidence the security, economic, and political 
climate for both of my cases will not improve in the immediate future and both of my 
cases are not better off as of March 2017 than they were in 2011. Egypt and Libya have 
radical Islamic groups within their countries that possess the will and the means to fight 
the status quo. Weapons caches from Qaddafi’s old army find their way across Libya’s 
borders into the hands of its neighbors including Egypt. While guns flow from Libya into 
Egypt, several migration routes flow from Egypt into Libya. Due to hundreds of armed 
rival militia groups in Libya, I assess with strong confidence the Libyans are not capable 
of stabilizing their country on their own. While the European Union wants Libya to make 
decisions for Libya, this idea appears unrealistic. Libya is too broken to solve their own 
issues by themselves. The foreign policy of letting Libya try to fix itself is dangerous not 
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only for Libya, but for MENA. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria view Libya as a 
suitable destination for their next area of operations if the conflict in Iraq and Syria were 
to eventually end. I assess Russia views their relationship with General Haftar as 
beneficial and they will continue to improve ties with him, along with playing a more 
active role in trying to solve the conflict. If General Haftar was more moderate towards 
Islamists in Libya, Russia would not be interested. General Haftar offers no disadvantage 
for Russia. He is a key figure in the process of eliminating radical groups throughout 
Libya. As previously stated, if the Kremlin were to somehow gain control of the flow of 
migrants from Libya into Europe, this would pose as a significant problem to the 





The map shows the majority of oil and gas fields, along with oil and gas pipelines 
are in Eastern Libya, which is territory controlled by General Haftar and Operation 
Dignity. I chose to use this graphic to give a visualization of Libya’s oil and gas fields, 
along with their energy capabilities. 
Economically, there are little to no prospects for both case studies. The political 
and security climates are to blame. As of March 2017, the Egyptian economy is surviving 
on loans from foreign governments, mainly Saudi Arabia and a few other Gulf states. 
                                                          
1 Source: Heritage Oil Limited, 2014. Map of Libya’s Natural Resources-Available at 




What will happen once Egypt stops getting loans? Will Egypt be able to financially 
support itself with little to no foreign help? I assess Egypt has the means to support itself, 
however the political and security problem must be solved first. Egypt has a lot of small 
to medium sized businesses and a large private sector workforce, the opposite of what 
Libya has. USAID has worked to minimize bureaucratic interference and facilitate the 
process it takes to start up a business in Egypt.  
 Libya has more to offer than Egypt does in regards to natural resources. Libya 
however does not have the means to possess a basic economy. Once the Libyan economy 
has a direction and strategy, they will be able to move forward towards self-sufficiency. 
Just like their political problems, Libya is not capable of solving their economic problems 
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